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DISPLACEMENT AND PREEMPTION OF CLIMATE
NUISANCE CLAIMS
Jonathan H. Adler*

INTRODUCTION
New York City is concerned about the threat of climate change.1 Rising
temperatures, hotter summers, and potential sea-level rise are all anticipated
to impose significant costs on the city, prompting investments in adaptive
measures.2 Like many other municipalities faced with climate risks, New
York has sought recompense from those who produce and market fossil fuels,
which are the primary contributor to anthropogenic climate change.3
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1 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 469 (S.D. N.Y. 2018) (City of New
York) (nRWLQJWKHFRQFOXVLRQVRIWKH1HZ<RUN&LW\3DQHORQ&OLPDWH&KDQJHWKDW³FOLPDWHFKDQJHLV
DOUHDG\DIIHFWLQJ1HZ<RUN&LW\DQGZLOOKDYHDVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWLQWKHIXWXUH´ 7KH1HZ<RUN&LW\
0D\RU¶V2IILFHRI&OLPDWHDQG(QYLURQPHQWDO-XVWLFHKDVDQ2IIice of Climate Resiliency tasked with
developing plans to address the consequences of climate change within the city. See About, CITY OF NEW
YORK, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/orr/about/about.page (last visited June 14, 2022) This office is advised
by the New York City Panel on Climate Change, which has published several reports on the expected
consequences of climate change within the city; New York City Panel on Climate Change, CITY OF NEW
YORK, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/orr/challenges/nyc-panel-on-climate-change.page (last visited June 14,
2022).
2 City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 469 QRWLQJ³1HZ<RUN&LW\LVH[FHSWLRQDOO\YXOQHUDEOHWR
sea-OHYHOULVHGXHWRLWVORQJFRDVWOLQH´DQGWKDW³WKH&LW\KDVEHHQIRUFHGWRWDNHSURDFWLYHVWHSVWRSURWHFW
itseOIDQGLWVUHVLGHQWVIURPWKHGDQJHUVDQGLPSDFWVRIJOREDOZDUPLQJ´ 
3 See William Neuman, To Fight Climate Change, New York City Takes on Oil Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/nyregion/new-york-city-fossil-fueldivestment.html; see also Michael A. Livermore, Why Cities Are Suing Oil Giants, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (June 26, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2018-06-26/why-cities-aresuing-oil-JLDQWV ³7KHFLWLHVWKDWKDYHMRLQHGWKHVHODZVXLWVZLOOIDFHDKRVW RIFOLPDWHFKDQJH-related
costs, [and] . . . are looking to the major oil companies . . .to compensate the taxpayers who are currently
holding the WDE´  5DFKHO 5RWKVFKLOG State Nuisance Law and the Climate Change Challenge to
Federalism, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 414 (2019) ³>(@DFK RI WKHVH ODZVXLWV LV VHHNLQJ PRQHWDU\
damages to deal with the costs of adapting to environmental change and coping ZLWKGLVDVWHUHYHQWV´ 
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In January 2018, NYC filed suit in federal court against several
multinational oil companies alleging trespass, private nuisance, and public
nuisance by producing, promoting and selling products (fossil fuels) that
contribute to global warming.4 According to NYC, fossil fuel companies
have long known of the potential consequences of producing and marketing
fossil fuels, and therefore bear some responsibility for the abatement and
other costs imposed on the city due to climate change.5 Specifically, NYC
filed suit for compensatory damages for both past and future costs incurred
by the city to protect its property and infrastructure, as well as the health,
safety, and property of city residents.6
Although NYC filed its case in federal court, it sought to press its claims
under state law. Federal common law claims would be displaced under
existing Supreme Court doctrine.7 State law-based claims, alleging an
interstate nuisance or product liability-based nuisance claims would not be
precluded by Supreme Court precedent.8 At least that is how NYC thought
to frame its case. On April 1, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
&LUFXLWGLVPLVVHG1<&¶VFODLPVEHFRPLQJWKHILUVWIHGHUDODSSHOODWHFRXUW
to conclude that state law-based climate nuisance claims were preempted by
federal law.9
This was not the first climate change nuisance case to reach the Second
Circuit. In 2004, NYC and several like-minded states brought claims against
VHYHUDORIWKHQDWLRQ¶VODUJHVWSRZHUSURGXFHUVDOOHJLQJWKHLUJUHHQKRXVHJDV
emissions contributed to the public nuisance of global warming under federal
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See Complaint, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018).
Id.
See City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 470.
See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423-29 (2011).
Federal preemption of state-law-based nuisance claims is rare in the environmental law context.
See Jason J. Czarnecki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2007). Among other things, courts have rejected preemption claims in
cases alleging the marketing and sale of fuel additives contributed to a public nuisance, even though the
additive was used to comply with federal environmental regulations. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether Products Liability Litigation (MTBE), 725 F.3d 65, 96 (2nd Cir. 2013).
9 City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81, 95-98 (2d Cir. 2021) [herewithin City of New
York II]. Most other courts to consider this question, to date, have focused on whether federal law is
sufficiently preemptive to justify removal of climate-based nuisance claims filed in state court. See, e.g.,
City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d. 895, 906- WK&LU  FRQFOXGLQJFLWLHV¶VWDWH-law nuisance
claims against fossil fuel proGXFHUVGLGQRWUDLVHDVXEVWDQWLDOIHGHUDOTXHVWLRQ %GRI&QW\&RPP¶UVRI
Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 25 F.4th 1238, 1267-71 (10th Cir. 2022) (affirming district
FRXUW¶VUHPDQGRYHUGXHWRODFNRIIHGHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ 0D\RU &LW\&ouncil of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C.,
31 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2022) (same); Cnty. of San Mateo v Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733 (9th Cir. 2022)
(same); Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 2022 WL 1617206 (1st Cir. 2022) (same). An intermediate
appellate court in Hawaii also recently rejected preemption claims raised by oil company defendants. See
City and Cnty. of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2022) (order
GHQ\LQJGHIHQGDQW¶VPRWLRQIRUIDLOXUHWRVWDWHDFODLP 
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common law.10 The Second Circuit had looked favorably on those claims,
UHMHFWLQJWKHFRUSRUDWHGHIHQGDQWV¶DUJXPHQWVWKDWVXFKIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZ
claims were displaced by federal law.11
This victory was short-lived. In 2011, in American Electric Power Co.
v. Connecticut (AEP), a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Clean Air
Act (CAA) displaced federal common law nuisance claims for interstate air
pollution²in this case, greenhouse gases.12 Because the CAA authorizes
federal regulation of greenhouse gases, and federal common law is generally
disfavored, the justices concluded that federal common law public nuisance
claims against greenhouse gas emitters were precluded by the CAA.13
The AEP decision put a quick end to suits alleging climate change
constituted an interstate nuisance under federal common law. Efforts to
distinguish AEP, in which the plaintiffs sought injunctions from claims
seeking damages, were unavailing. 14 Yet in closing off one avenue of climate
change litigation, the Court left open others, including claims that activities
contributing to climate change could constitute a nuisance or otherwise
actionable tort under state law.15 It was on this basis that NYC and other local
governments filed suit in 2017 and 2018 against fossil fuel producers seeking
to recover for the cost of adapting to climate change under state law.16
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10 See Connecticut, et al. v. Am. Elec. Power, No. 04 Civ. 5669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. filed
July 21, 2004).
11 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, 374-81 (2nd Cir. 2009). The court also rejected
claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that their claims were barred by the political question doctrine,
or that they had failed to state a claim under the federal common law of public nuisance.
12 American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
13 Id. DW  ³7KH &OHDQ $LU $FW DQG the Environmental Protection Agency action the Act
DXWKRUL]HVZHKROGGLVSODFHWKHFODLPVWKHSODLQWLIIVVHHNWRSXUVXH´ 
14 See 1DWLYH 9LOO 2I .LYDOLQD Y([[RQ0RELO &RUS  )G   WK&LU   ³7KH
Supreme Court has held that federal common law addressing domestic greenhouse gas emissions has been
displaced by Congressional action. That determination displaces federal common law public nuisance
DFWLRQVVHHNLQJGDPDJHVDVZHOODVWKRVHDFWLRQVVHHNLQJLQMXQFWLYHUHOLHI´ 
15 AEP, 564 U.S. at  ³1RQHRIWKHSDUWLHVKDYHEULHIHGSUHHPSWLRQRURWKHUZLVHDGGUHVVHGWKH
availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore leave the matter open for consideration on
UHPDQG´ 7KHRSSRUWXQLW\WRILOHFOLPDWH-based claims was also facilitated by continuing improvements
in the science of climate attribution. See Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz, & Radley Horton, The Law and
Science of Climate Change Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57, 191-216 (2020).
16 See, e.g., Complaint, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018);
Complaint, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17- &DO$SS'HS¶W6XSHU&W-XO
2017) ; Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. RG17875 &DO$SS'HS¶W
Super. Ct. Sep. 19, 2017); Complaint, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03243 (Cal. App.
'HS¶W6XSHU&W'HF &RPSODLQW&W\RI0DULQY&KHYURQ&RUS1R&,9 &DO
$SS'HS¶W6XSHU&W-XO  Complaint, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CIV03222
&DO $SS 'HS¶W 6XSHU &W -XO    &RPSODLQW &W\ RI 6DQWD &UX] Y &KHYURQ &RUS 1R
&9 &DO $SS 'HS¶W 6XSHU &W -XO    &RPSODLQW IRU 3XEOLF 1XLVDQFH &LW\ RI 6DQ
Francisco v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17- &DO$SS'HS¶W6XSHU&W6HS &RPSODLQW
City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018); Complaint, City of Richmond
v. Chevron Corp., No. C18- &DO $SS 'HS¶W 6XSHU Ct. Jan. 22, 2018); Complaint and Jury
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While the Congressional enactment of environmental regulatory
statutes displaces federal common law actions for interstate pollution, such
enactments do not necessarily preempt state common law actions, even
where pollution crosses state boundaries.17 Under longstanding precedent, it
is more difficult to preempt state common law than it is to displace federal
common law. And in the years since AEP, lower courts have largely
recognized this distinction, generally rejecting claims that federal law
preempts state-law based nuisance claims, even for interstate nuisances, so
long as claims are based upon the law of the state in which the nuisance
originated.18
Having accepted that claims based on federal common law are
displaced, plaintiff municipalities are grounding their claims in state law,
forcing courts to consider whether federal law should be interpreted to
preclude state law claims the way it has displaced federal common law
claims.19 As most of these cases have been filed in state courts, carbon
industry defendants have first sought to have cases removed to federal court
before pressing their preemption claims. These efforts have been largely
unsuccessful on both counts.20 New York City, however filed its claim in
federal court, prompting a direct adverse holding on preemption.
In City of New York v. Chevron Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
6HFRQG &LUFXLW FRQFOXGHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW SODLQWLIIV PD\ QRW ³XWLOL]H VWDWH
tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable for the damages caused by
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'HPDQG%GRI&QW\&RPP¶UVRI%RXOGHU&W\Y6XQFRU(QHUJ\ 86$ 1R&9 &ROR
Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2018); Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Providence Cty. July 2, 2018); Complaint, King County v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2-11859-0 (Wash. Super.
&W0D\ 3ODLQWLII¶V&RPSODLQW0D\RU &LW\RI%DOWLPRUHY%33/&1R-C-18-004219
(Md. Cir. Ct. Jul. 20, 2018).
17 AEP86DW ³/HJLVODWLYHGLVSODFement of federal common law does not require the
µVDPHVRUWRIHYLGHQFHRIDFOHDUDQGPDQLIHVW>FRQJUHVVLRQDO@SXUSRVH¶GHPDQGHGIRUSUHHPSWLRQRIVWDWH
ODZ´  FOHDQHGXS 
18 See, e.g., Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 695 (6th Cir. 2015); Bell v.
Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 2013); Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848
N.W. 2d 58 (Iowa 2014). See also Matthew Morrison & Bryan Stockton, What’s Old Is New Again: State
Common-Law Tort Actions Elude Clean Air Act Preemption, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10282, 10284 (2015);
Ben Snowden, Clean Air Act Preemption of State-Law Tort Claims since AEP v. Connecticut, 16 No. 4
ABA ENVTL. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMMITTEE NEWSL.16, 17-18 (2015).
19 See Tracy Hester, Climate Tort Federalism, 13 FIU L. REV. 79, 85 (2019) (noting the new wave
RIFOLPDWHVXLWV³UHIOHFWDFRQVFLRXVVWUDWHJLFFKRLFH´WRXWLOL]HVWDWHODZLQVWDWHFRXUWV 
20 See, e.g., City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C, 969 F.3d 8895, 906-08 (9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting claim
state-law claims raised substantial federal question justifying removal); City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil
&RUS:/ '1-  UHPDQGLQJQXLVDQFHFODLPV %GRI&QW\&RPP¶UVRI%RXOGHU
Cnty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 25 F.4th 1238 (10th &LU  DIILUPLQJGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VUHPDQG
over due to lack of federal jurisdiction); Mayor & City of Baltimore, 31 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2022)(same);
Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F.Supp.3d 142 (D.R.I. 2019) (nuisance claims not completely
preempted by Clean Air Act); County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F.Supp.3d 934 (N.D. Cal.
2018 (state law nuisance claims not preempted by Clean Air Act). Courts have also considered other
bases for removal, including the federal officer doctrine. See, e.g., BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City of
Baltimore, 141 S.Ct. 1532, 1536-37 (2021).
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JOREDOJUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQV´21 Echoing the arguments of a prior district
court opinion in a parallel suit filed in California,22 the Second Circuit
concluded that any such claims necessarily arise under federal common law,
that federal common law for such claims is displaced by the Clean Air Act,
and that the claims are therefore precluded.23 In effect, the Court held that
state law claims against fossil fuel companies are preempted, despite the lack
of any preemptive legislative action, implicit or otherwise.
There are strong policy arguments for the adoption of broad nationwide
(if not also international) policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions and
mitigate climate change.24 The combination of a carbon tax and targeted
policies to spur and facilitate climate-related innovations, for example, would
be superior to a polyglot of state-based lawsuits and monetary settlements.25
Yet this would hardly justify the imposition of such a regime by judicial fiat,
nor does it justify judicial refusal to hear such claims in the absence of actual
legislative preemption. Whether state law nuisance actions are to be
preempted is a choice for Congress to make, and is a choice Congress has not
yet made.26 Accepting that the EPA has regulatory authority over greenhouse
gases,27 there is no legislation preempting state efforts to address the
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21 City of New York II, 993 F.3d at 85..
22 See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
23 The court also concluded that insofar as the suit implicated activities that cause greenhouse gas
emissions overseas, such claims must also fail. City of New York II, 993 F.3d at 85-86.
24 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007) (explaining why national climate policies are preferable to state or local
policies).
25 See, e.g., David A. Dana, The Mismatch between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, 18
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9 (2010) (arguing that treating the global climate as a common-pool resource is likely
to be more effective than nuisance litigation); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility
for the Failure of Global Warming Policies, 133 U. PENN. L. REV.     ³5HJXODWLRQ
through litigation is a less desirable climate change policy approach than a sound regulatory policy that
UHIOHFWVVRFLHW\ VEURDGLQWHUHVWV´ SHI-LING HSU, A CASE FOR THE CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR
HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011) (making the case for a carbon tax); Jonathan H. Adler,
Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing measures to facilitate innovation). But see Jonathan Zasloff, The
Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827
(2008) (arguing that successful climate nuisance claims against fossil fuel companies could result in the
imposition of a de facto carbon tax).
26 See ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
419 (2001) (noting that Congress never enacted measures to control the emissions of greenhouse gases);
see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?, 36
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1   ³)URPWR>@PRUHWKDQELOOVZHUHLQWURGXFHGLQ
&RQJUHVVWRUHJXODWH>JUHHQKRXVHJDVHV@EXWQRQHZHUHHQDFWHG´ .
27 The Supreme Court concluded that the EPA has such authority in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 527-29 (2007). For a critique of that decision, see Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate
Change Litigation, 3 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61 (2007).
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28 Many of the recent suits seek damages to compensate plaintiff jurisdictions for the costs of
climate change and the need to adapt to such changes. These suits do not seek to impose emission
reduction obligations on any fossil fuel companies directly. It is certainly possible, however, that when
faced with the costs of compensating jurisdictions harmed by climate change, some companies may opt
to change their behavior so as to reduce their liability.
29 Depending on how a given climate nuisance claim is pled, it could raise Dormant Commerce
Clause or Due Process issues insofar as it targets or affects wholly out-of-state conduct. Such questions,
however, are wholly distinct from the preemption question addressed in this article. Whether a given
climate nuisance claim is viable under the law of a given state is also a question beyond the scope of this
article. For an overview of some of the issues involved, see Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a
Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011).
30 See Denise Antolini, Attacking Bananas and Defending Environmental Common Law, 58 CASE
WSTRN L. REV. 663, 665 (2008) (noting the range of environmental nuisance actions that are filed despite
the existence of state and federal environmental regulation).
31 As the Court declared in Erie LQDELWRIRYHUVWDWHPHQW ³>W@KHUHLVQRIHGHUDOJHQHUDOFRPPRQ
ODZ´ Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). As the Court noted in AEP, since Erie ³DNHHQHU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJGHYHORSHG´86DWDOEHLWRQHWKDWKDV been subject to substantial criticism. See,
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consequences of greenhouse gas emissions themselves.28 While other legal
doctrines may constrain or complicate state common law climate nuisance
claims, federal preemption should not be among them.29
Before discussing displacement and preemption, it is worth detailing
what it is that would be displaced or preempted. Accordingly, Part I begins
with a brief sketch of the common law environmental protection that
preceded and matured alongside the development of environmental
regulation, including the rise of federal common law actions for interstate
pollution. With an eye toward preemption, and its role within our federalist
system, Part II sketches the system of state and local environmental
regulation that served as the background for the adoption of federal
environmental law.
While federal environmental laws are quite
comprehensive and far-reaching, they operate alongside state and local
efforts, often in collaborative fashion, and rarely preempt state regulation or
litigation.30 7KHUHVXOWLVDV\VWHPRI³FRRSHUDWLYHIHGHUDOLVP´XQGHUZKLFK
state governments retain the laboring oar in environmental policy, even if
denied the helm. Federal law routinely imposes a prescriptive floor of
regulatory stringency, but rarely imposes a prohibitory ceiling. Federal
environmental law largely leaves questions of institutional choice to state
policy makers as well, including the choice between adopting administrative
regulations and relying upon common law causes of action to police
potentially polluting behavior.
Parts III and IV discuss displacement and preemption respectively, in
the context of environmental law. Under current doctrine, displacement and
preemption are distinct doctrines with distinct rationales and divergent
standards. Displacement concerns which branch of the federal government
is responsible for the development of legal standards. Preemption concerns
the effect of federal law on the laws of the several states. As federal common
law is disfavored under the Erie doctrine,31 the requirements for displacement
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e.g., Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, In Praise of Erie—And Its Eventual Demise, 10 J. L., ECON.
& POL¶Y 225 (2013). For a defense of Erie, see Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 10 J.L., ECON & POL¶Y 17 (2013).
32 See Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
STATES¶ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249-70 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds. 2007). For
a broader argument against federal preemption, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How
Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007).
33 Should Congress enact new legislation focusing on greenhouse gas emissions or the threat of
climate cKDQJHWKLVFRXOGZHOODIIHFWWKHDQDO\VLVDQGDOWHUWKLV$UWLFOH¶VFRQFOXVLRQ
34 See, supra note 9 and cases cited therein.
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are rather meek, and satisfied by the mere presence of a legislative enactment.
,Q WKLV FRQWH[W OHJLVODWLYH DFWLRQ LV XQGHUVWRRG WR UHIOHFW WKH OHJLVODWXUH¶V
preference for some alternative to leaving a question for judicial resolution.
As discussed in Part IV, preemption is quite different from
displacement. Unlike federal common law, state law is quite favored, as
befits a system in which federal powers are defined and limited while state
police powers are plenary.32 Establishing preemption requires a heavier lift,
grounded in federal supremacy and legislative intent. So, while the
enactment of federal environmental statutes may have broadly displaced the
federal common law of interstate nuisances, little state common law of
nuisance (or other state environmental law, for that matter) is preempted by
federal environmental regulation. The foregoing suggests a rather
straightforward application to the problem of climate change: Federal
common law actions are displaced but state law actions are not preempted.
Whatever legal obstacles such suits may face, federal preemption is not (yet)
among them.33
Whether to rely upon federal or state law to address a given
environmental concern is a vertical separation of powers question. As Part
V explains, climate change presents a different set of incentives and
constraints on state policymaking than states may face in other areas. Such
incentives and constraints might serve as a policy justification for federal
climate legislation and the preemption of alternative state approaches. Yet
not only has Congress not enacted climate-specific regulatory measures, the
provisions of federal environmental law under which greenhouse gases may
be controlled are the same provisions that are applied to traditional air
pollutants.
In the absence of preemptive federal legislation, state-law based climate
nuisance claims should not be preempted, even if federal common law
actions should be displaced. This would seem to be evident from the
doctrine, but not every federal court has recognized it. As discussed in Part
VI, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit misapplied current
GRFWULQHLQKROGLQJWKDW1HZ<RUN¶VQXLVDQFHFODLPVZHUHILUVWSUHHPSWHG
by federal common law, and then displaced by the Clean Air Act. Other
circuits to have faced related questions (albeit in the context of removal) have
not made the same mistake.34 $VGLVFXVVHGLQ3DUW9,WKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶V
opinion misapplied existing law, relying on mistaken assumptions about the
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nature of our federal system. Other legal arguments for preemption of statelaw-based nuisance claims for climate-related damages are equally
unavailing. While there may be grounds to dismiss state-law-based nuisance
claims filed by local governments against fossil fuel producers, displacement
and preemption are not among them.
To close, the paper offers some concluding thoughts and poses
questions for further consideration as to the proper relationship between
federal environmental law and litigation over interstate air pollution
generally, and climate change in particular.
I.

COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Before there was federal environmental regulation, many environmental
problems were handled through common law protections of private property
from interference by others.35 For centuries, the common law doctrines of
nuisance and trespass aided landowners who sought to protect their
property²and, by extension, their persons²from interferences caused by
the activities of others. Nuisance law, in particular, was a means through
which landowners could protect against environmental harms.36
The underlying principle of nuisance in Anglo-American law dates back
to at least the mid-thirteenth century, when the noted jurist Henry of Bracton
ZURWHWKDW³QRRQHPD\GRLQKLVRZQHVWDWHDQ\WKLQJZKHUHE\GDPDJHRU
nuisanFH PD\ KDSSHQ WR KLV QHLJKERU´37 So, for example, it was not
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35 See generally, Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE WEST. RES. L.
REV. 583 (2008). See also J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 753, 753
(2008) ³Common law nuisance doctrine has the reputation of having provided much of the strength and
content of environmental law prior WRWKHULVHRIIHGHUDOVWDWXWRU\UHJLPHVLQWKHV´ 0RUULVRQ 
Stockton, supra QRWHDW ³8QWLOWKHVLQGLYLGXDOVDQGVWDWHVIUHTXHQWO\XVHGVWDWHFRPPRQlaw torts such as nuisance to protect the environment and individual property rigKWV´  CREATIVE
COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (Clifford L. Rechtschaffen & Denise
E. Antolini eds. 2007).
36 See Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the Common Law
(Part I), 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10292,    ³7KHSXEOLFQXLVDQFHDFWLRQLVSDUWLFXODUO\XVHIXOWR
UHPHG\HQYLURQPHQWDOKD]DUGV´ *1HOVRQ6PLWK,,,Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental
Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 40 (1995)
³6LQFH WKH HDUO\ VHYHQWHHQWK FHQWXU\ FRXUWV KDYH UHFRJQL]HG QXLVDQFH DQG WUHVSDVV WKHRULHV LQ
environmental matters.); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §2.1,
DW GHG  ³>7@KHGHHSHVWURRWVRIPRGHUQHQYironmental law are found in the principles of
nuisance. . . . [N]uisance theory and case law is the common law backbone of environmental and energy
ODZ´ 
37 See Elizabeth Brubaker, The Common Law and the Environment: The Canadian Experience, in
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 88-89 (Peter J. Hill and Roger E. Meiners eds., 1997). By some
accounts, the origins of nuisance may be traced back to the writ of novel disseisin and 1166. See Julian
Morris, Climbing Out of the Hole: Sunsets, Subjective Value, the Environment, and the English Common
Law, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL L.J. 343, 347-48 (2003); see also Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old
Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases about the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761,
765-72 (1979).
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permissible for one landowner to emit noxious odors or fumes onto the land
RI DQRWKHU RU WR FDXVH D QHLJKERU¶V ODQG WR EH IORRGHG38 This principle
became embodied in the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or
³8VH\RXURZQSURSHUW\VRDVQRWWRKDUPDQRWKHU¶V´ZKLFKZDVIDPRXVO\
embraced in William Aldred’s Case in 1611.39
:LOOLDP $OGUHG¶V FDVH PD\ EH DQFLHQW KLVWRU\ Eut the underlying
dispute should resonate today. A businessman built a hog sty in a residential
neighborhood, allegedly fouling the air for local residents. When suit was
brought, the defendant claimed the plaintiffs were oversensitive²³RQHRXJKW
not to KDYHVRGHOLFDWHDQRVHWKDWKHFDQQRWEHDUWKHVPHOORIKRJV´40²and
any inconvenience or intrusion was outweighed by the public benefit of hog
SURGXFWLRQ$IWHUDOO³WKHEXLOGLQJRIWKHKRXVHIRUKRJVZDVQHFHVVDU\IRU
WKHVXVWHQDQFHRIPDQ´41 The court rejected this defense, however, on the
grounds that no landowner has the right to use his or her property in manner
that will prevent the quiet enjoyment of other nearby properties. Otherwise
³JRRGDQGSURILWDEOH´XVHVRISURSHUW\PD\EHHQMRLQHGDVQuisances where
they cause pollution that prevents others from enjoying the property of their
own.42 As Blackstone would describe the rule:
[I]f one erects a smelting-house for lead so near the land of another that the vapor and
smoke kills his corn and grass, and damages his cattle therein, this is held to be a
nuisance. . . . [I]f one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet being done in that
SODFHQHFHVVDULO\WHQGVWRWKHGDPDJHRI¶¶DQRWKHU¶VSURSHUW\LWLVDQXLVDQFHIRULWLV
incumbent on him to find some other place to do that act where it will be less
RIIHQVLYH¶43

07/08/2022 10:39:15

38 See Richard A. Epstein, Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law, in Nuisance Cases, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 551, 555 (2008) ³It has long been understood that the discharge of noxious substances
LQWRWKHDLURUWKHZDWHUOD\DWWKHFRUHRIWKHODZRIQXLVDQFH´ 6Dnford v. Univ. of Utah, 488 P.2d 741
(1971) (recognizing flooding caused by diversion of flow of surface waters may constitute a nuisance).
39 See 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610). This case, involving a dispute between a
landowner and the owner of a neighboring pig sty, is the first known reported case to expressly rely upon
this rule for its decision. For more background on the case, see Coquillette, supra note 37, at 772±77.
40 9 Coke 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
41 Id. $FFRUGLQJWR&RTXLOOHWWH³>Q@HYHUEHIRUHKDGDGHIHQGDQWVRFOHDUO\FODLPHGVRFLDOXWLOLW\DV
DGHIHQVHWRDQXLVDQFHDFWLRQ´&RTXLHOOHWHsupra note 37, at 775.
42 9 Coke 58b-59a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
43 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217-218.
44 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 661 (1986) ³Land is such a
fundamental natural resource that most environmental threats, whether directed at natural resources or
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Grounded in the sic utere principle, the law of nuisance operated as a
powerful constraint on potentially noxious land uses for many centuries, at
least where the harms were readily observable and traceable, and the numbers
of properties involved were sufficiently small to avoid coordination problems
and excessive transaction costs.44
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SXEOLFKHDOWKFDQHDVLO\EHUHDGDVLQWHUIHULQJZLWKWKHODQG¶VXVHDQGHQMR\PHQWDQGWKHUHE\SRWHQWLDOO\
UDLVLQJSULYDWHQXLVDQFHFODLPV´ see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, §2.1 at 112 G HG   ³1XLVDQFH DFWLRQV UHDFK SROOXWLRQ RI DOO SK\VLFDO PHGLD²air, water, land,
groundwater²by a wide variety of means. Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every major
industrial DQGPXQLFLSDODFWLYLW\WKDWWRGD\LVWKHVXEMHFWRIFRPSUHKHQVLYHHQYLURQPHQWDOUHJXODWLRQ´ 
45 See Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions – Avoiding
the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 656 (1976).
46 DAVID STRADLING, SMOKESTACKS AND PROGRESSIVES: ENVIRONMENTALISTS, ENGINEERS,
AND AIR QUALITY IN AMERICA, 1881-1951 3 (1999).
47 Id. at 41.
48 See William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 998-999 (1966);
Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 328±29 (2005).
49 Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison
with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 362, 364±65 (1990).
50 Private parties may also file suits alleging public nuisances, but only if they are able to
GHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH\KDYHVXIIHUHGD³VSHFLDOLQMXU\´WRGLVWLQJXLVKWKHLULQWHUHVWIURPWKDWRIWKHSXEOLF
at large. See id. at 364.
51 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1977).
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During the 19th century, however, many courts were more willing to
engage in the sort of balancing the court in Aldred’s Case eschewed.45
Nonetheless, nuisance law remained a powerful means of constraining
polluting activities, as well as encouraging the siting of potentially polluting
activities away from where they might cause harm. During the Progressive
Era, for instance, anti-smoke activists targeted individual facilities, raising
complaints and occasionally filing nuisance suits.46 Such suits were often
successful, and they created powerful incentives.47 The threat of nuisance
liability, and a court order that could force a facility to clean up or close,
encouraged firms to locate potentially polluting facilities farther away from
residential communities to avoid complaints and litigation.
The law of private nuisance focused on those activities that interfered
with the use or enjoyment of private land. By contrast, the doctrine of public
nuisance developed to address those activities which interfered with the
rights of the public at large, such as by obstructing a highway, disrupting a
public market, or fouling the air of the town square.48 Because public
nuisance actions are filed to protect rights common to the public, they are
most often filed by public authorities, acting on behalf of the state in its
sovereign capacity.49 Those activities subject to suit as public nuisances are
also subject to regulation under the sovereign police power.50
The Restatement (Second) of Torts GHILQHV D SXEOLF QXLVDQFH DV ³DQ
XQUHDVRQDEOH LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK D ULJKW FRPPRQ WR WKH JHQHUDO SXEOLF´51
Though it does not provide a precise definition of what would constitute an
³XQUHDVRQDEOH´LQWHUIHUHQFHWKHRestatement notes that public nuisances are
typically characterized by one or more of the following characteristics: 1) the
RIIHQGLQJFRQGXFWFUHDWHVD³VLgnificant interference with the public health,
the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public
FRQYHQLHQFH´   WKH FRQGXFW LV ³SURVFULEHG E\ VWDWXWH RUGLQDQFH RU
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHUHJXODWLRQ´DQG WKHFRQGXFWLV³RIDFRQWLQXLQJQDWure or
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has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or
KDV UHDVRQ WR NQRZ KDV D VLJQLILFDQW HIIHFW XSRQ WKH SXEOLF ULJKW´ 52 As
Professor Thomas Merrill observes, this only provides the most general
guidance for resolving nuisance claims as it does not, for instance, make clear
whether courts should balance the degree of harm against the utility of the
GHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWRUDGRSWVRPHWKLQJFORVHUWRDVWULFWOLDELOLW\UXOH53
Although public nuisance claims in federal court are not particularly
common, states have repaired to the federal common law of interstate
nuisance in seeking to reduce or eliminate pollution emanating from other
jurisdictions. In the noted case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company,
for example, the staWHRI*HRUJLDVRXJKWUHOLHIIURPWKH³QR[LRXVJDV´HPLWWHG
by copper companies in an adjoining state.54 These emissions, Georgia
FODLPHG FDXVHG WKH³ZKROHVDOH GHVWUXFWLRQ RI IRUHVWV RUFKDUGVDQG FURSV´
within its territory.55 In an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
Supreme Court agreed that Georgia was entitled to relief, explaining:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory
should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its
mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have
suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its
control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from the same
source. 56
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52 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1977).
53 See Merrill, supra note 48 at 329; see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,
   ³>1@XLVDQFH VWDQGDUGVRIWHQDUHYDJXHDQGLQGHWHUPLQDWH´ 1RUWK&DUROLQDH[UHO&RRSHUY
7HQQHVVHH 9DOOH\ $XWK  )G   WK &LU   ³>:@KLOH SXEOLF QXLVDQFH ODZ GRXEWOHVV
encompasses environmental concerns, it does so at such a level of generality as to provide almost no
VWDQGDUGRIDSSOLFDWLRQ´ 
54 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 238.
57 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S.
473 (1931).
58 See Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law
Remedies of Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55, 64 (2002) (documenting a dramatic
increase in environmental public nuisance cases in both state and federal courts between the 1960s and
1990s).
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In other cases, the Supreme Court recognized public nuisance claims
against upstream discharges of untreated sewage and ocean dumping of
waste, among other things.57
The gradual adoption of environmental regulations at the local, state,
and federal levels did not put an end to nuisance litigation. Far from it. The
number of environmental nuisance cases continued to rise through the late
20th century, even as environmental regulations proliferated at all levels of
government.58 Rather than eliminate nuisance litigation, environmental
regulations served as a complement. Both regulation and litigation appear to
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have been responses to the same underlying concerns and an increased
demand for action to control the environmental consequences of industrial
and other activity. Accordingly, where environmental regulations are absent
or inadequate, the filing of nuisance suits should be no surprise.59
II.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

07/08/2022 10:39:15

59 See Sam Kalen, Policing Federal Supremacy: Preemption and Common Law Damage Claims as
a Ceiling Regulatory Floor, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2016) ³Environmental statutory schemes often
lack mechanisms for addressing damages to individuals or their property, forcing litigants to explore the
XWLOLW\RIHQYLURQPHQWDOFODLPV´ ,QWKLVIDVKLRQQXLVDQFHODZFRQWLQXHVWRRSHUDWHDVD³EDFNVWRSWR
SROOXWLRQVWDWXWHV´See Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, 32 ECOL.
L.Q. 113, 147 (2005).
60 See generally Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).
61 STRADLING, supra note 46, at 4.
62 Id. at 76.
63 See Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS¶N 44, 44 (1982).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 47.
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While not as old as nuisance law, state and local regulation of pollutiongenerating activities and other environmental concerns long predate the
enactment of major federal environmental laws. Such regulations were often
not only concerned with locally undesirable land uses or activities that could
be considered nuisances but also addressed some resource conservation
concerns. By the time of the post-World War II environmental awakening,
state and local governments had been active in various forms of
environmental regulation for decades. The groundswell of public support
that induced federal legislative action encouraged the adoption of more
aggressive policies at the state and local level as well.60
At the same time as Progressive Era anti-smoke activists sought to
harness nuisance law, local governments began adopting smoke-control
ordinances to improve local air quality. As environmental historian David
6WUDGOLQJ UHFRXQWV ³WKH ODWH V DQG WKH HDUO\ V FRQWDLQ DEXQGDQW
examples of urban and suburban environmental activism, much of it
VXFFHVVIXO´61 Philadelphia, for example, enacted a smoke-control ordinance
in 1905, which quickly reduced smoke levels in the heart of the city.62 The
City of Brotherly Love was not alone. By 1920, some forty cities had local
smoke control ordinances in place.63 By 1960, the number had more than
doubled, and by 1970, when the Clean Air Act was enacted, it topped 100.64
County-level air pollution control efforts likewise increased dramatically in
the post-war period, rising from 2 in 1950 to 81 in 1970.65 State regulations
also followed in much of the country, beginning with Oregon in 1951.66 By
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1970, every state had an air pollution control program of some sort, albeit of
varying stringency.
A similar story could be told with water pollution. Throughout the
FRXQWU\ ³ORFDO SXEOLF LQGLJQDWLRQ RYHU WKH ILOWK RI ORFDO ZDWHUV´ WULJJHUHG
state legislative responses.67 By 1966, every state had adopted water
pollution legislation of some sort. 68 Just as Cleveland residents took the lead
at the beginning to clean the Cuyahoga River before its infamous (and often
misunderstood) 1969 fire,69 other communities made strides to protect local
resources well before meaningful federal regulation was adopted. As would
be expected, some stDWHV¶HIIRUWVZHUHFOHDUO\PRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQGPRUH
successful than others. Then, as now, the adopted measures were imperfect,
and environmental goals were often balanced against other concerns.
1RQHWKHOHVVDVWKHQDWLRQ¶VHQYLURQPHQWDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV blossomed in the
post-war period, state and local governments began to act.
Those federal environmental statutes enacted prior to 1970 were rather
limited, largely focusing on the conduct of the federal government itself,
rather than private industry.70 Yet beginning in 1969, Congress began to erect
a broad environmental regulatory architecture, including the Clean Air Act
in 197071 and the Clean Water Act in 1972. 72 These laws, and others adopted
during the same time period,73 were adopted against the background of state
and local environmental measures.
&RQJUHVV¶V HQYLURQPHQWDO ODZPDNLQJ GLG QRW VHHN WR VXSSODQW SUHexisting state and local efforts. Rather, the express purpose of many federal
statutes was to supplement incomplete or insufficiently protective state and
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Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 105±13 (2002).
70 See Percival, supra note 60, at 1158 ³7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWIHGHUDOODZZDVUHJXODWRU\LQFKDUDFWHU
prior to 1970, the primary targets of environmental regulation were federal agencies rather than private
LQGXVWU\´ 
71 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661f (2000). It is worth noting that the first federal clean air legislation was
enacted in 1955 (Pub. L. No. 80-159), and amended in 1963, 1965, 1966, and 1967. With a few
exceptions, such as the creation of federal emission standards for new automobiles mandated in 1967, the
pre-1970 statutes were largely non-regulatory in nature. Although the 1970 Act was itself, technically, a
series of amendments to the prior statutes, it is commonly referred to as the Clean Air Act, as it provides
the foundation for the contemporary regulatory structure.
72 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1385 (2000). The Clean Water Act is formally known as the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.
73 Other major federal environmental laws enacted during this time period include the National
Environmental Policy Act (1969), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, the Endangered Species Act (1973), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544, the Federal Environmental Pesticide Act (aka, the Federal Insecticide Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act 1972), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300fbefore th300j, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, and the
Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671.
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67 See, e.g., N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality; Part I:
State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 234 (1966).
68 See id. at 215.
69 See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental
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local efforts.74 As made clear in the findings of the major federal
environmental statutes, states were to retain their primary role. The
FRQJUHVVLRQDOILQGLQJVLQWKH&OHDQ$LU$FWIRUH[DPSOHGHFODUHWKDW³DLU
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
JRYHUQPHQWV´75 Major pollution control laws like the CAA and CWA also
contained broad savings clauses expressly preserving state authority to enact
and enforce laws controlling pollution. 76 Outside of the regulation of vehicles
and consumer products sold in interstate markets, states largely retained the
ability to adopt more stringent standards of their own.77
While federal environmental laws grant expansive regulatory authority
to federal agencies, most environmental statutes are implemented following
D ³FRRSHUDWLYH IHGHUDOLVP´ PRGHO78 Under this model, the federal
government outlines the contours of a given regulatory program, typically

44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 9 Side B
07/08/2022 10:39:15

74 The history of these statutes generally supports the same conclusion. See Kalen, supra note 59,
at 1597.
75 86& D  (YHQPRUHHPSKDWLFDOO\WKH&OHDQ:DWHUSURYLGHVWKDW³>L@WLVWKHSROLF\
of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to
SUHYHQWUHGXFHDQGHOLPLQDWHSROOXWLRQ´86& §1251(b).
76 42 U.S.C. §7416 (providing that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this chapter shall
preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard
or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement
of air pollution; except that if an emission standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable
implementation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title, such State or political subdivision
may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or
limitation under such plan or section.") and 33 U.S.C. §1370 (providing that, "[e]xcept as expressly
provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political
subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting
discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that
if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate
agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition,
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or
other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance under
this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the
States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States."
77 See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory and
Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES¶ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 178 (Richard A.
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds. 2007) (observing that federal environmenWDOODZV³DLPWRHOLPLQDWHVWDWH
regulation where it would undermine the efficient scope of markets for particular commercial
FRPPRGLWLHV´ 
78 See 1HZ<RUNY8QLWHG6WDWHV86   ³>:@KHUH&RQJUHVVKDVWKHDXWKRULW\
to regulate private DFWLYLW\XQGHUWKH&RPPHUFH&ODXVHZHKDYHUHFRJQL]HG&RQJUHVV¶SRZHUWRRIIHU
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted
by federal regulation. . . . This arrangement . . . has been termed FRRSHUDWLYHIHGHUDOLVP´ LQWHUQDOFLWDWLRQV
and quotations omitted)). Statutes that employ the cooperative federalism model include the Clean Air
Act, Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, portions of the Safe Drinking Water
Act, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
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through statutory mandates elaborated upon by regulatory measures.79 States
are then encouraged to implement the program in lieu of the federal
government, in accordance with federal guidelines. Provided these standards
are met, states are free to tailor the details of their individual programs to
accommodate local conditions and concerns. In most cases the federal
standards operate as a floor ± albeit sometimes a highly prescriptive one ±
and states remain free to adopt more stringent measures.80 State programs
that meet federal standards are typically eligible for federal financial
assistance.81 States that fail to adopt adequate programs are not only denied
the relevant federal funding²they can also be subject to various sanctions
and federal preemption of their programs.82
This cooperative model was explicitly adopted so as to ensure continued
Though federal
state involvement in environmental protection.83
policymakers wish to call the shots and set major environmental policy
priorities, the major environmental laws are structured so as to continue to
rely upon the ability of state policymakers to identify, implement and enforce
environmental requirements.84 The geographic and economic diversity of the
nation requires local knowledge and expertise that is often unavailable at the
federal level.85 Environmental problems, and their solutions, will vary from
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79 See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1184
(1995); see also DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION (1997).
80 Whether federal intervention discourages greater state or local regulation by altering the
incentives faced by state and local policymakers is a separate question, explored in Jonathan H. Adler,
When Is Two a Crowd: The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2007).
81 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000) (authorizing financial support for state water pollution control
programs that adopt desired pollution control policies); see also Percival, supra note 60, at 1173 (noting
the use of federal funding to encourage land-use planning and solid waste management).
82 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7509 (2000) (detailing sanctions for failure to attain National Ambient Air
Quality Standards under Clean Air Act); see also Percival, supra note 60, at 1174 (noting under most
environmental laws, the federal government will adopt and enforce a federal regulatory program in the
absence of a sufficient state program). For a discussion of whether these conditions transgress
constitutional bounds, see Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?
Coercion, Cooperative Federalism, and Conditional Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q.
671 (2016).
83 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV.
1516, 1534 (1995) ³The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take primary responsibility for
implementing federal standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent
VWDQGDUGV´ .
84 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1196 (1977) (noting that the federal
JRYHUQPHQW³LVGHSHQGHQWXSRQVWDWHDQGORFDODXWKRULWLHVWRLPSOHPHQW>HQYLURQPHQWDO@SROLFLHVEHFDXVH
RIWKHQDWLRQ¶VVL]HDQGJHRJUDSKLFGLYHUVLW\WKHFORVHLQWHUUHODWLRQ between environmental controls and
ORFDOODQGXVHGHFLVLRQVDQGIHGHUDORIILFLDOV¶OLPLWHGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGHQIRUFHPHQWUHVRXUFHV´ 
85 See Dwyer, supra QRWHDW QRWLQJWKDW³WKHNQRZOHGJHQHFHVVDU\WRDGPLQLVWHUDQ\DLU
pollution control proJUDPFDQEHIRXQGRQO\DWWKHORFDOOHYHO´  See also HENRY N. BUTLER &
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place to place, limiting the federaOJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRDGRSWQDWLRQZLGH
solutions to environmental concerns that are equally applicable to multiple
parts of the country.86
As a general matter, federal preemption of state environmental law is
the exception. Congress was quite explicit in those few instances in which it
sought to preempt state environmental law-making, whether by state
legislatures, agencies, or courts.87 The Clean Air Act, for instance, makes
explicit that various emission control requirements for stationary sources and
planning requirements for local governments only establish federal floors,
leaving states with the discretion to pursue more aggressive measures of their
own. When it comes to the regulation of motor vehicles, however, the Clean
Air Act explicitly provides that only the federal government and California
may impose emission control requirements on cars and trucks.88 Likewise,
when the Clean Air Act seeks to preempt state and local regulation of
emissions from various consumer products, so as to prevent the balkanization
of relevant product markets, it is also quite explicit about it.89
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JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY    ³)HGHUDO
regulators never have been and never will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of
information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the technical requirements of
SDUWLFXODUORFDWLRQVDQGSROOXWLRQVRXUFHV´ 7KLVREVHUYDWLRQLVEDVHGRQWKHLQVLJKWVRI1REHO/DXUHDWH
economist F.A. Hayek, who observed ³>W@KHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIZKLFKZHPXVWPDNHXVH
never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
FRQWUDGLFWRU\NQRZOHGJHZKLFKDOOWKHVHSDUDWHLQGLYLGXDOVSRVVHVV´)$+D\HN The Use of Knowledge
in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945).
86 Stewart, supra QRWHDW QRWLQJWKH³VREHULQJIDFW´WKDW³HQYLURQPHQWDOTXDOLW\LQYROYHV
too many intricate, geographically variegated physical and institutional interrelations to be dictated from
:DVKLQJWRQ´ 
87 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543, 7573 (prohibiting states from adopting or enforcing
emission control standards for aircrafts or new motor vehicles); Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 2210(n)(2)
(2000) (granting original jurisdiction to federal district courts for any public liability action arising out of
or resulting from a nuclear incident). Rather than completely preempting state environmental law in a
particular area, Congress commonly includes preemptive federal requirements for product design or
engineering specifications. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1561±64 (2007).
88 See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 313, 330 (1985); see also
Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1101 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that Congress
intenGHG&DOLIRUQLDWR³DFWDVDNLQGRIODERUDWRU\IRULQQRYDWLRQZLWKUHJDUGWRWKH6WDOH VSLRQHHULQJ
HIIRUWVDWDGRSWLQJDQGHQIRUFLQJPRWRUYHKLFOHHPLVVLRQVWDQGDUGV´ See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000)
(preemption of state automobile emission standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (2000) (preemption of
state fuel standards). EPA may waive preemption of emission standards adopted by California, subject to
certain conditions. See  86&   E  &DOLIRUQLD¶V DELOLW\ WR DGRSW LWV RZQ VWDQGDUGV ZDV D
consequence of California adopting vehicle emission controls prior to the adoption of federal standards.
89 Perhaps paradoxically, other aspects of the Clean Air Act, such as its fuel regulations, facilitate
if not actually require the balkanization of interstate markets. See generally Andrew P. Morriss &
Nathaniel Stewart, Market Fragmenting Regulation Why Gasoline Costs So Much (and Why It's Going to
Cost More), 72 BROOK. L. REV. 939 (2007).
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Federal intervention is probably most needed to address interstate
spillover concerns. Yet only a small portion of current federal regulations
can be justified on these grounds.90 Over the past half-century, federal
regulation of intrastate air and water pollution has been more extensive than
federal regulation of interstate spillovers, making it more difficult to argue
that such provisions have the purpose or effect of preempting state-law-based
protections. Moreover, the few provisions of federal environmental law
targeted at interstate spillovers were rarely invoked in the first three decades
after the major federal pollution control statutes were adopted.
While the Clean Air Act contains a few provisions that specifically
address interstate pollution concerns, the EPA largely ignored these measures
for many years. Indeed, where states sought to invoke the Act to obtain relief
for upwind contributions to local air pollution, the EPA refused to act and
IHGHUDO FRXUWV ODUJHO\ YDOLGDWHG WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHVLUH WR LJQRUH
interstate air pollution.91 Only since the turn of the last century has the EPA
meaningfully responded to states seeking to control emissions from upwind
states that contribute to downwind nonattainment of federal air quality
standards.92 The Clean Water Act also authorizes the EPA to address
transboundary pollution, but here again the federal government has been
largely absent, rarely invoking the relevant provisions.93
III. DISPLACEMENT

07/08/2022 10:39:15

90 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2341 (1998); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
NYU ENVTL L.J. 130 (2005).
91 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 959
(1997); DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: HOW CONGRESS GRABS
POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE 126 (2005).
92 See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d
1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
93 See Merrill, supra note 91, at 960-61.
94 The Supreme Court first took jurisdiction over an interstate pollution dispute in Missouri v.
Illinois. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). For a
thorough discussion of this history, see Robert Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the
Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004). For a fuller exploration of the
&RXUW¶V XVH RI RULJLQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LQ HQvironmental cases, see Robert D. Cheren, Environmental
Controversies “Between Two or More States,” 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 105 (2014).
95 See Rothschild, supra note 3, at 424 (noting that the Supreme Court had allowed cases concerning
interstate pollution to proceed under both state and federal common law).
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For over a century, states brought interstate pollution disputes to the
6XSUHPH &RXUW RIWHQ XQGHU WKH &RXUW¶V RULJLQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ94 While the
total number of cases was not particularly significant, the Court considered
common-law-based interstate pollution claims and, where appropriate,
provided relief.95 If the Court concluded that upstream or upwind
jurisdictions failed to respect the territory of their downstream or downwind
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neighbors, the Court issued injunctions against pollution sources96 and, in
some cases, even ordered states to construct necessary facilities for adequate
waste management.97 Upon the adoption of federal environmental regulatory
statutes, however, this practice came to an end. Resting on the assumption
that federal common law should be no more than a gap-filler of last resort,
the Court concluded that the enactment of federal environmental laws
eliminated any need for a court-crafted federal common law of interstate
nuisance. Whereas demonstrating preemption of state law may be difficult,
as discussed in the next section, the Court concluded that demonstrating
displacement of federal common law should be easy.
7KH&RXUW¶VFKDQJHRIKHDUWFDPHDERXWLQLWVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIDORQJrunning water pollution dispute between the state of Illinois and the City of
Milwaukee.98 Prior to the enactment of the Clean Water Act, Illinois filed a
bill of complaint with the Supreme Court alleging that several Wisconsin
localities, including the sewage commissions of Milwaukee city and county,
were discharging pollution into Lake Michigan.99 ,OOLQRLVFODLPHG³VRPH
million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other waste
materials are discharged daily into the lake in the MilwaukeHDUHDDORQH´
creating a public nuisance.100 As it had in prior cases, the Court recognized
WKDW,OOLQRLV¶FODLPVDURVHXQGHUIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZ101 Although Congress
KDGHQDFWHGODZV³WRXFKLQJLQWHUVWDWHZDWHUV´DQGXUJLQJWKHLUSURWHFWLRQWKH
Court did not find that these enactments had displaced its responsibility to
adjudicate the dispute between Illinois and Milwaukee, even though federal
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96 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (issuing an injunction
against the discharge of noxious gasses that crossed state lines and harmed Georgian land); Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 420±21 (1929) (enjoining the defendants from excessively diverting waters from
the Great Lakes to the Chicago Drainage Canal for the purpose of sewage disposal); New Jersey v. City
of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 476, 482±83 (1931) (issuing an injunction restraining New York City from
dumping garbage into the ocean).
97 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 420±21 (1930) (requiring the Sanitary District of
Chicago to construct and operate suitable sewage plants); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1930)
(requiring New York to build a sewage treatment plant at Port Jervis before diverting water from the
Delaware River to the New York City water supplies).
98 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Milwaukee I); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 308 (1981) (Milwaukee II); see also Percival, supra note 94, at 758-65.
99 The jurisdictions included four Wisconsin cities, the Sewerage Commission of the City of
Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. Milwaukee I, 406
U.S. at 93.
100 Id.
101 Id. DW ³:KHQZHGHDOZLWKDLUDQGZDWHULQ their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a
IHGHUDOFRPPRQODZ´ ,QWHUHVWLQJO\HQRXJKZKHQ,OOLQRLVILUVWVRXJKWWREULQJLWVFODLPVEHIRUHWKH
Supreme Court, some of the justices were skeptical of the claims. Justice Harry Blackmun, in particular,
FDXWLRQHGWKDWKHDULQJVXFKFODLPV³ZLOOEHDELJKHDGDFKHIRUWKH&RXUW´See Zasloff, supra note 25, at
1844 (quoting Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun to the United States Conference (Sept. 16, 1971)).
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102 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103-04. Indeed, while the authority for the Attorney General to act was
longstanding, it had rarely been invoked prior to the 1960s. See Adler, supra note 69, at 134; see also
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water
Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 772±74 (1971) (discussing how federal authority had previously been
understood).
103 Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 230.
104 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
105 Id. at 107 n.9.
106 Id. at 107. While stressing the need for a uniform rule of decision, the Court also acknowledged
that equitable concerns could justify the consideration of state-specific concerns, including whether one
VWDWHKDGYROXQWDULO\DGRSWHGPRUH³VWULFWVWDQGDUGV´WKDQGLGLWVQHLJKERUV
107 Id.
108 The Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (1972) was enacted in October 1972 following a veto
by President Nixon. See Clean Water: Congress Overrides Presidential Veto, in CQ ALMANAC 1972, at
11-17 (28th ed. 1973)
109 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 308, 311±12 (1981).
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law authorized suits by the Attorney General for the abatement of
pollution.102
Relying upon Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,103 and recognizing the
³IHGHUDO LQWHUHVW LQ D XQLIRUP UXOH RI GHFLVLRQ´104 the Court accepted the
responsibility of adjudicating the dispute and considering whether to enjoin
the nuisance of which Illinois complained. The Court noted the need for a
XQLIRUP IHGHUDO VWDQGDUG DV RSSRVHG WR WKH³YDU\LQJFRPPRQ ODZ RI WKH
individuDO6WDWHV´105 At the same time, the Court also acknowledged that the
SDVVDJHRI³QHZIHGHUDOODZVDQGQHZIHGHUDOUHJXODWLRQV´FRXOGPDNHWKLV
role obsolete.106 ³%XWXQWLOWKDWFRPHVWRSDVV´ZURWH-XVWLFH'RXJODVIRUWKH
&RXUW³IHGHUDOFRXUWVZLOOEHHmpowered to appraise the equities of the suits
DOOHJLQJWKHFUHDWLRQRIDSXEOLFQXLVDQFHE\ZDWHUSROOXWLRQ´107
What Justice Douglas suggested might come to pass did²and right
quick. Milwaukee I was decided in April 1972. The Federal Water Pollution
ConWURO$FW$PHQGPHQWVRIZKDWZHFRPPRQO\UHIHUWRDVWKH³&OHDQ
:DWHU$FW´ZDVSDVVHGRYHU3UHVLGHQW5LFKDUG1L[RQ¶VYHWRRQO\VL[PRQWKV
later.108 With this enactment Congress dramatically expanded the federal role
in water pollution regulation, even if it did not do much to address the
particular concern of interstate water pollution.
In 1980, the Milwaukee I defendants returned to the Supreme Court
seeking relief from judicially imposed orders to abate their pollution of Lake
Michigan.109 This gave the Court an opportunity to consider the implications
RI WKH &OHDQ :DWHU $FW¶V SDVVDJH DQG WR H[WULFDWH LWVHOI IURP FRQWLQXLQJ
involvement in interstate pollution disputes. It was an opportunity the Court
would not pass up.
While acknowledging the need to provide a federal rule of decision
XQGHU IHGHUDO FRPPRQ ODZ LQ D ³IHZ DQG UHVWULFWHG´ LQVWDQFHV WKH &RXUW
rejected the idea that resolving interstate disputes²and fashioning and
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110 Id. DW ³1RWKLQJLQWKLVSURFHVVVXJJHVWVWKDWFRXUWVDUHEHWWHUVXLWHGWRGHYHORSQDWLRQDOSROLF\
in areas governed by federal common law than they are in other areas, or that the usual and important
concerns of an appropriate division of functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary are
LQDSSOLFDEOH´ 
111 Id. ³7KHHQDFWPHQWRIDIHGHUDOUXOHLQDQDUHDRIQDWLRQDOFRQFHUQDQGWKHGHFLVLRQZKHWKHUWR
displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from
GHPRFUDWLFSUHVVXUHVEXWE\WKHSHRSOHWKURXJKWKHLUHOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVLQ&RQJUHVV´ .
112 Id. DW ³>:@KHQ&RQJUHVVDGGUHVVHVDTXHVWLRQSUHYLRXVO\JRYHUQHGE\DGHFLVLRQUHVWHGRQ
IHGHUDOFRPPRQODZWKHQHHGIRUVXFKDQXQXVXDOH[HUFLVHRIODZPDNLQJE\IHGHUDOFRXUWVGLVDSSHDUV´ 
113 See id. DW ³)HGHUDOFRXUWVXQOLNHVWDWHFRXUWVDUHnot general common law courts and do not
SRVVHVVDJHQHUDOSRZHUWRGHYHORSDQGDSSO\WKHLURZQUXOHVRIGHFLVLRQ´ 
114 Though, as noted above, the field of water pollution control was not entirely free of federal
involvement when Milwaukee I was litigated. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
115 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 317.
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enforcing standards under federal common law²was its responsibility.110
Instead, the Court explained, resolution of such disputes should be guided by
legislative action.111 And although nothing in the text or history of the Clean
:DWHU $FW LQGLFDWHG &RQJUHVV¶V LQWHQW WR GLVSODFH WKH &RXUW¶V UROH LQ
adjudicating interstate pollution disputes, the majority of the Court concluded
that the enactment of a comprehensive federal regulatory regime for water
pollution obviated any need for judicial intervention.112
Leaning heavily on the idea that federal common law is disfavored,113
the Court explained it need not wait for Congress to enact a law expressly
depriving the judiciary of the power to act. Rather, the mere presence of a
federal statute occupying the relevant space and assigning primary
responsibility for pollution control to the executive branch would be
$V WKH &RXUW H[SODLQHG ³WKH DSSURSULDWH DQDO\VLV LQ
sufficient.114
determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously the subject
of federal common law is not the same as that employed in deciding if federal
law preempts state law.115 Whereas the latter requires due regard for state
SUHURJDWLYHV³>V@XFKFRQFHUQVDUHQRWLPSOLFDWHGLQWKHVDPHIDVKLRQZKHQ
the question is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and
accordingly the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not
UHTXLUHG´116 To the contrary, Justice Rehnquist explained, the Court should
³µVWDUW ZLWK WKH DVVXPSWLRQ¶ WKDW LW LV IRU &RQJUHVV QRW IHGHUDO FRXUWV WR
DUWLFXODWHWKHDSSURSULDWHVWDQGDUGVWREHDSSOLHGDVDPDWWHURIIHGHUDOODZ´
and thus the presumption is that federal common law should be displaced.117
The Court would not affirm that this conclusion applied equally to
interstate air pollution until deciding AEP LQEXWWKHORJLFRIWKH&RXUW¶V
displacement doctrine was clear. Few doubted the principle underlying
Milwaukee II would dictate an equivalent result in an air pollution case, even
one involving greenhouse gases. Thus, in AEP, the Obama Administration
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did not even try to argue against displacement, its commitment to an
aggressive climate policy notwithstanding.118
The state plaintiffs in AEP brought a federal common law claim of
LQWHUVWDWH QXLVDQFH DJDLQVW WKH QDWLRQ¶V ODUJHVW HPLWWHUV RI FDUERQ GLR[LGH
seeking broad injunctive relief. Although litigated in tandem with the suit
that would become Massachusetts v. EPA,119 the AEP case languished in the
lower courts long after Massachusetts was decided.120 Once it reached One
First Street, however, the case was quickly and easily resolved in a
unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.121
Reaffirming the rationale of Milwaukee II, Justice Ginsburg explained
that whether a federal regulatory program displaces preexisting federal
common law claims turns on the action taken by Congress. The enactment
of regulatory legislation, in particular, is the basis of displacement, not any
other indicia of legislative intent, nor not any judicial assessment of whether
such legislation is effective or sufficient to address the downstream or
GRZQZLQGVWDWH¶VFRQFHUQV+RZ RUHYHQZKHWKHU VXFKOHJLslation has or
ZRXOGEHLPSOHPHQWHGE\IHGHUDOUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHVZDVQRWWKH&RXUW¶V
FRQFHUQ ³7KH WHVW IRU ZKHWKHU FRQJUHVVLRQDO OHJLVODWLRQ H[FOXGHV WKH
GHFODUDWLRQRIIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZLVVLPSO\ZKHWKHUWKHVWDWXWHµVSHDN>V@
directly to [the] questioQ¶DWLVVXH´122
Given that the Court had decided four years earlier that the CAA applied
to greenhouse gases,123 it was rather obvious that federal common law claims
DJDLQVW *+* HPLWWHUV ZRXOG KDYH WR EH GLVSODFHG XQGHU WKLV WHVW  ³$V
Milwaukee II made cleDU´-XVWLFH*LQVEXUJZURWH³WKHUHOHYDQWTXHVWLRQIRU
SXUSRVHV RI GLVSODFHPHQW LV µZKHWKHU WKH ILHOG KDV EHHQ RFFXSLHG QRW
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118 7KH 6ROLFLWRU *HQHUDO¶V PHULWV EULHI XUJHG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW WR UHYHUVH WKH ORZHU FRXUW¶V
conclusion that plaintiffs had standing on prudential, rather than constitutional, grounds, and
recommended remand so the Second Circuit could reconsider its displacement holding in light of
subsequent regulatory events. See Steven Mufson, Obama Administration Sides with Utilities in Supreme
Court Case about Climate Change, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2010) available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/26/AR2010082606632.html.
119 It is worth noting that the underlying legal theories in the Massachusetts litigation and AEP
litigation operated in tandem to place the federal government in a difficult position. Insofar as the federal
government argued that the EPA lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act,
this undermined the arguments that nuisance claims were displaced. At the same time, if the EPA lacked
the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be more difficult to argue that nuisance suits were
displaced. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit: American Electric
Power v. Connecticut, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 301±02 (2011).
120 Indeed, AEP sat at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for an extraordinarily long
time after oral argument. See Marcia Coyle, Questions Arise About Long Delay by Sotomayor-Led Panel
in Climate Case, NAT¶L L. J., (May 29, 2009), https://www.law.com/almID/1202431051311/. TKHFRXUW¶V
decision was eventually issued over three years after oral argument with only two of the original panel
members participating. The third, Sonia Sotomayor, was by then a justice on the Supreme Court. See
Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
121 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
122 Id. at 424 (cleaned up).
123 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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ZKHWKHU LW KDV EHHQ RFFXSLHG LQ D SDUWLFXODU PDQQHU¶´ 124 And because
greenhouse gases were air pollutants subject to regulation under the CAA,
displacement followed. As Justice Ginsburg explained:
the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.
Massachusetts made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution
VXEMHFWWRUHJXODWLRQXQGHUWKH$FW$QGZHWKLQNLWHTXDOO\SODLQWKDWWKH$FWµVSHDNV
GLUHFWO\¶WRHPLVVLRQVRIFDUERQGLR[LGHIURPWKHGHIHQGDQWV¶SODQWV125
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124 American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011) (quoting Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 308, 324 (1981)).
125 AEP, 564 U.S. at 426..
126 Id. DW   7R WKLV -XVWLFH *LQVEXUJ DGGHG VRPHZKDW FKHHNLO\ ³&RQJUHVV FRXOG KDUGO\
preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon dioxide unless covered by a permit. After all, we each
emit cDUERQGLR[LGHPHUHO\E\EUHDWKLQJ´Id.
127 There are plenty of reasons to believe EPA regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air
Act is not desirable. See Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse
Gas Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL¶Y 421 (2011). Nor is such
regulation likely to be a particularly efficient way to reduce GHG emissions. See Jonathan H. Adler, The
Legal and Administrative Risks of Climate Regulation, 51 ENVTL. L. REP. 10485 (2021).
128 AEP86DW ³$VMilwaukee II made clear, however, the relevant question for purposes
RIGLVSODFHPHQWLVµZKHWKHUWKHILHOGKDVEHHQRFFXSLHGQRWZKHWKHULWKDVEHHQRFFXSLHGLQDSDUWLFXODU
PDQQHU¶´ FLWDWLRQRPLWWHG 
129 Id.
130 Id. at 420 (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
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7KH³FULWLFDOSRLQW´ZDVWKDW³&RQJUHVVGHOHJDWHGWR(3$WKHGHFLVLRQ
whether and how to regulate carbon-GLR[LGHHPLVVLRQVIURPSRZHUSODQWV´126
not whether the resulting regulations were effective or desirable.127 Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg noted, were EPA to adopt inadequate regulations, or even
WR ³GHFOLQH WR UHJXODWH FDUERQ-GLR[LGH HPLVVLRQV DOWRJHWKHU´ LW ZRXOG QRW
matter for displacement purposes.128 Even if the Clean Water Act could be
said to impose a more comprehensive system of effluent controls than the
&$$WKLVWRRZDVLUUHOHYDQWIRU³>R@IQHFHVVLW\&RQJUHVVVHOHFWVGLIIHUHQW
UHJXODWRU\UHJLPHVWRDGGUHVVGLIIHUHQWSUREOHPV´129
In enacting the CAA, as interpreted in Massachusetts v. EPA, Congress
made the scope and stringency of GHG emission controls something for the
EPA to determine in the first instance. Should states or private groups
GLVDJUHH ZLWK WKH (3$¶V SROLF\ FRQFOXVLRQV RU EHOLHYH WKDW WKH (3$¶V
regulations are insufficiently stringent, they would retain the ability to
petition the agency or file suit in federal court, much as the states and
environmentalist groups did in Massachusetts. What they could not do is
seek to transfer authority over emission controls from the political branches
to the courts through the use of federal common law.
7KH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQHPSKDVL]HGWKDWIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZLVGLVIDYRUHG
³7KHUHLVQRIHGHUDOJHQHUDOFRPPRQODZ´WKHRSLQLRQQRWHGTXRWLQJErie
Railroad v. Tompkins.130 Rather, most questions governed by the common
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Id. (citation omitted).
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 308, 314 (1981)).
See Merrill, supra note 48 at 314.
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,    ³,QDOOSUH-emption cases ... we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
XQOHVVWKDWZDVWKHFOHDUDQGPDQLIHVWSXUSRVHRI&RQJUHVV¶´  FOHDQHGXS 
135 AEP, 564 U.S. at 423±24.
136 It is certainly possible that Justice Sotomayor disagreed with her colleagues on this point, as she
was recused from the case due to her participation in the panel that heard arguments in AEP on the Second
Circuit. The case had been argued years prior to her nomination, but was only issued later, with both
participating judges on the panel rejecting the arguments for displacement. See Connecticut v. Amer.
Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009). There is no way to know whether then-Judge or Justice
Sotomayor agreed with that opinion.
137 Id. at 429; see also Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 866 (9th Cir.
  3UR - FRQFXUULQJ  ³'LVSODFHPHQW RI WKH IHGHUDO FRPPRQ ODZ GRHV QRW OHDYH WKRVH LQMXUHG
without a remedy. Once federal common law is displaced, state nuisance law becomes an available option
WRWKHH[WHQWLWLVQRWSUHHPSWHGE\IHGHUDOODZ´ .
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ODZ DUH OHIW WR WKH VWDWHV  )HGHUDO FRPPRQ ODZ LV UHVHUYHG IRU ³µVXEMHFWV
ZLWKLQQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLYHSRZHUZKHUH&RQJUHVVKDVVRGLUHFWHG¶´VXFKDV
LQWKHFDVHRIDQWLWUXVWODZRU³ZKHUHWKHEDVLFVFKHPHRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ
so demDQGV´VXFKDVZKHUHLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRUHVROYHLQWHUVWDWHGLVSXWHVDQG
Congress has not addressed the concern through legislation.131 Interstate air
and water pollution could be governed by federal common law, but only in
the absence of regulatory legislation. The federal common law of interstate
nuisance is thus a contingent backstop²a means of filling interstices insofar
as is necessary to enable states to safeguard their sovereign interests in their
own territory. Yet as the Court had held in Milwaukee II³ZKHQ&RQJUHVV
addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal
common law, the need for such an unusual exercise of law-making by federal
FRXUWVGLVDSSHDUV´132
Whereas the Court has adopted (though not always applied) a
presumption against the preemption of state law causes of action, no such
presumption applies with displacement. If anything the constitutional
VWUXFWXUHZRXOGZDUUDQWD³VSHFLDOSUHVXPSWLRQ´against the use of federal
common law.133 Preemption of state law must be clearly shown so as to
SURWHFW WKH VWDWHV¶ VRYHUHLJQ LQWHUHVWV ZLWKLQ WKH IHGHUDO V\VWHP RI GXDO
sovereignty.134 No such interest protects the policymaking power of the
IHGHUDOFRXUWV³>,@WLVSULPDULO\IRUWKHRIILFHRI&RQJUHVVQRWWKHIederal
FRXUWVWRSUHVFULEHQDWLRQDOSROLF\LQDUHDVRIVSHFLDOIHGHUDOLQWHUHVW´-XVWLFH
Ginsburg explained for the Court.135 Thus, whereas the justices routinely
disagree and divide over the preemptive effect of various federal laws, they
were of one mind on the question of displacement, unanimously rejecting the
use of federal common law to control emissions already subject to
administrative control under federal law,136 while leaving the question of
CAA preemption of state law based suits to another day.137
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IV. PREEMPTION
The enactment of a IHGHUDOVWDWXWHWKDW³VSHDNVGLUHFWO\´WRWKHLVVXHDW
hand may be sufficient to displace federal common law. Far more is required
to preempt state law.138 Federal common law may be disfavored, but so too
is the federal preemption of state law. The displacement of federal common
law implicates a different legal standard than does the preemption of statelaw-based claims.139
As a constitutional matter, Congress has the power to preempt state law,
as federal law is supreme.140 The question in preemption cases is whether
Congress has, in fact, preempted state law.141 This is not to be presumed, as
WKH SUHHPSWLRQ RI VWDWH ODZV LV DOZD\V ³D VHULRXV LQWUXVLRQ LQWR VWDWH
VRYHUHLJQW\´142 As a general matter, preemption will not be found unless the
&RXUW FRQFOXGHV SUHHPSWLRQ ³ZDV WKH FOHDU DQG PDQLIHVW SXUSRVH RI
&RQJUHVV´143 RUWKDW³DVFKHPHRIIHGHUDOUHJXODWLRQ>LV@VRSHUYDVLYHDV
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to
VXSSOHPHQWLW´144 7KLVPRUHVWULQJHQWVWDQGDUGSURWHFWVWKHVWDWHV¶VRYHUHLJQ
interests in maintaining their police powers free of federal interference.145
Federal preemption comes in two forms, express and implied. Express
preemption is straightforward. Where Congress, or a federal agency,
explicitly preempts state laws on a given subject, states are barred from
adopting and enforcing their own regulations.146 Yet Congress need not be
so explicit for courts to find preemption. Preemption may be implied either
³ZKHUH WKH VFKHPH RI IHGHUDO UHJXODWLRQ LV VR SHUVXDVLYH DV WR PDNH
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to
44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 14 Side B
07/08/2022 10:39:15

138 See Zasloff, supra QRWHDW ³GLVSODFHPHQWRIIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZKDUGO\LPSOLHVWKH
preemption of sWDWH FRPPRQ ODZ´  (SVWHLQ supra QRWH  DW  ³WKH SUHVXPSWLRQ RQ SUHHPSWLRQ
differs from the federal-federal to the federal-state context. On matters of federal-state regulation, the
basic presumption is one against preemption, subject to some key e[FHSWLRQV´ 
139 See Merrill, supra note 48 at 314.
140 See U.S. CONSTDUW9,FO SURYLGLQJIHGHUDOODZ³VKDOOEHWKHVXSUHPH/DZRIWKH/DQGDQG
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
WKH&RQWUDU\QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ´ 3XUVXDQWWRWKH6XSUHPDF\&ODXVH³&RQJUHVVKDVWKHSRZHUWRSUHHPSW
VWDWHODZ´$UL]RQDY8QLWHG6WDWHV86  
141 See :\HWK Y /HYLQH  86     ³>7@KH SXUSRVH RI &RQJUHVV LV the ultimate
WRXFKVWRQH´).
142 0HGWURQLF,QFY/RKU86   SOXUDOLW\RSLQLRQ  >3@UHHPSWLRQLV³DVHULRXV
LQWUXVLRQLQWRVWDWHVRYHUHLJQW\´ 
143 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
144 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 20304 (1983).
145 See, e.g. -RQHV Y 5DWK 3DFNLQJ &R  86     ³7KLV DVVXPSWLRQ SURYLGHV
DVVXUDQFH WKDW µWKH IHGHUDO-VWDWH EDODQFH¶ ZLOO QRW EH GLVWXUEHG XQLQWHQWLRQDOO\ Ey Congress or
XQQHFHVVDULO\E\WKHFRXUWV´ 
146 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.86DW ³,WLVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWZLWKLQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
OLPLWV&RQJUHVVPD\SUHHPSWVWDWHDXWKRULW\E\VRVWDWLQJLQH[SUHVVWHUPV´ 
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VXSSOHPHQWLW´147 (so-FDOOHG³ILHOGSUHHPSWLRQ´ RUZKHUHVWDWHDQGIHGHUDO
law conflict or compliance with state law would obstruct, if not preclude,
compliance with federal law (so-FDOOHG³FRQIOLFWSUHHPSWLRQ´ 148 In all such
LQVWDQFHV&RQJUHVVLRQDOLQWHQWLV³WKHXOWLPDWHWRXFKVWRQH´RISUHHPSWLRQ
analysis.149
Although courts may find federal preemption where Congress has not
made its intent to preempt state law explicit, they are generally reluctant to
do so.150 Explicit statutory language will do the trick, but other sources of
statutory meaning may require a heavier lift. Likewise, there is no question
that federal law must trump when state and federal requirements directly
conflict, but mere difference in policy or purpose is unlikely to demonstrate
a legislative intent to preempt state lawmaking.
Preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity, whether
through state-OHYHO DGPLQLVWUDWLYH UHJXODWLRQV RU WKH VWDWH¶V FRPPRQ ODZ
The net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less regulation than
there would have been otherwise.151 Federal laws precluding state regulation
of automobile design mean that manufacturers need only comply with one
regulatory standard. Federal regulations in such cases serve as a regulatory
³IORRU´ DQG D UHJXODWRU\ ³FHLOLQJ´ DW WKH VDPH WLPH  ,Q RWKHU FDVHV
preemption may serve to ensure that there is no regulation of a given type or
governing particular subject matter, as where federal law precludes states
from adopting particular rules, but the federal government does not adopt
rules of its own.152 Where implied preemption is found, this will typically
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147 *DGHY1DW¶O6ROLG:DVWH0JPW$VV¶Q86  
148 Id.
149 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S.
150, 162±63 (2016) (same); see also CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (explaining
WKDWFRXUWVVKRXOG³Iocus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence
RI&RQJUHVV¶SUHHPSWLYHLQWHQW´ 
150 See, e.g., Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (holding the Atomic Energy
Act does not preempt state laws prohibiting uranium mining).
151 See PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 15 (2004) (noting federal preemption has often
EHHQ³GHVLJQHGWRIDFLOLWDWHJUHDWHUWRWDOdeUHJXODWLRQ´ HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO ,QVRPHFDVHVWKHSXUSRVH
of federal preemption is to replace one type of regulation with another. This still results in less regulation
than if the federal regulation was adopted in addition to the state regulation. The effects of preemption
across states may not be uniform, however. A federal statute that imposes a federal standard when only
a handful of states have regulated will increase regulation in some jurisdictions at the same time that it
reduces regulation by preempting preexisting rules elsewhere. For more on the effects of federal
environmental regulation on the ability of states to pursue their own environmental regulatory policies,
see Adler, supra note 80.
152 The most obvious example, albeit a case of constitutional rather than statutory preemption, occurs
XQGHUWKH³GRUPDQWFRPPHUFHFODXVH´6tates are precluded from adopting measures that discriminate
against out-of-state trade not because it is assumed that such regulations will be adopted by Congress.
Rather, there is a constitutional presumption against the adoption of such rules by any level of government,
though Congress does retain the authority to adopt laws limiting the flow of interstate commerce or even
GHOHJDWLQJDXWKRULW\WRWKHVWDWHVWRDGRSWVXFKPHDVXUHVWKHPVHOYHV7KLVGLYLVLRQRIDXWKRULW\³FUHDWHV
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preclude any state or local regulation whatsoever.153 Where Congress
explicitly preempts state regulation, however, the scope of the preemption
usually will be limited to the extent provided for in the statutory text.
Given that preemption generally operates to reduce aggregate
regulatory burdens, it should be no surprise that federal preemption of state
environmental regulatory standards is often sought by business interests
VHHNLQJ WR HVWDEOLVK UHJXODWRU\ XQLIRUPLW\ D ³FHLOLQJ´ RQ UHJXODWRU\
stringency, or both.154 Federal preemption of state automotive emission
regulations, for example, resulted from lobbying by U.S. automakers fearing
the potential for different emissions standards to be adopted in different
states²and believing that federal standards would be less stringent than
those developed in the states.155 This is not to say that there are not sometimes
economic justifications for preempting variable state standards with a single
federal standard, only to note that this pressure for federalization often comes
from industry.156
The mere adoption of a federal regulatory standard that operates as a
regulatory ³IORRU´ GRHV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ SUHHPSW VWDWH UHJXODWLRQ DV D OHJDO
matter (though it may well have that practical effect).157 For example, a
federal regulation imposing emission limitations on an industrial facility will
not necessarily preempt a less stringent or differently structured state
regulation governing emissions from the same facility. As a practical matter,
regulated facilities are required to meet the more stringent standard, but the
existence of two standards does not mean the two conflict. In most cases,
meeting the more demanding requirement will satisfy the less stringent one
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REVWDFOHVWRVWDWHV¶HQDFWLQJODZVWKDWDUHPRUHSURWHFWLYHRIWKHHQYLURQPHQW´ RICHARD J. LAZARUS,
THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 38 (2004). For more on the potential consequences of the
Dormant Commerce Clause on state-level environmental regulation, and climate regulation in particular,
see Brannon P. Denning, Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 64 CASE.
WEST. RES. L. REV. 1519 (2014).
153 See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 258-59 (2000).
154 Id. DW ³%\FUHDWLQJDFHLOLQJHQYLURQPHQWDOODZVPD\DOORZWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUWRRSHUDWH
ZLWKLQDSUHGLFWDEOHDQGXQLIRUPHQYLURQPHQW´ 6LPLODUDUJXPHQWVKDYHEHHQXVHGWRVXSSRUWIHGHUDO
preemption of state regulations and tort suits in other areas as well. See, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, Rules
Would Limit Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006 at D01 (preemption by Consumer Product Safety
Commission); Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Preempt Tort Suits, NAT¶L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004
(preemption by food & Drug Administration).
155 See Elliott et al., supra note 88.
156 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve &
Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992) (documenting examples of interest group rent-seeking in environmental
policy); POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L. Anderson, ed.
2000) (same).
157 For a more in-depth discussion of how regulatory floors may place downward pressure on state
regulatory standards, see Adler, supra note 80, at 94±106.
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as well.158 If permits are required from both federal and state agencies for
facility operation, then both permits are required even if compliance with one
should make compliance with the other a foregone conclusion, unless the less
stringent standards are explicitly or otherwise preempted by the federal
regulation.159 Conflict preemption only occurs if, for some reason,
compliance with both permits is impossible, such as would occur if state law
required the installation of a type of pollution control that federal law
prohibited, or that could not be installed in a manner that would allow for
compliance with federal law as well.
As noted above, most preemption in environmental law occurs with the
regulation of products that are manufactured for sale in interstate
commerce.160 For example, section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act prohibits
VWDWHVIURPDGRSWLQJ³DQ\VWDQGDUGUHODWLQJWRWKHFRQWURORIHPLVVLRQVIURP
new motor veKLFOHV´161 The Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any
state regulation of automotive fuel economy.162 Other preemption provisions
can be found in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,163
and the Toxic Substances Control Act,164 among other statutes.
As also noted, the structure of most federal pollution control laws is to
establish a prescriptive federal floor, invite state participation in the
administration and enforcement of federal standards, while also leaving room
for states to adopt more stringent requirements where state policymakers
conclude local conditions or preferences warrant.165 This is particularly true
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158 An exception to this will be if the standards are defined in terms that require the adoption of
particular control technologies or methods, in which case compliance with one standard might well
preclude and conflict with compliance with the other.
159 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (preempting state enforcement of emission standards less stringent
than existing federal standards).
160 See Ann Carlson, Federalism, Preemption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 2   ³HQYLURQPHQWDOUHJXODWLRQ± in which both the states and the federal government
play an active role ± IUHTXHQWO\UDLVHVSUHHPSWLRQTXHVWLRQV´ 
161 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). There are exceptions to this rule. The EPA may waive preemption of
emission standards adopted by California, subject to certain conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). Where the
EPA has approved a waiver for California, other states may adopt the California rule. In all cases,
KRZHYHU WKH RWKHU  VWDWHV PD\ QRW DGRSW D ³WKLUG´ VWDQGDUG  7KH &OHDQ $LU $FW FRQWDLQV VLPLODU
provisions governing standards for gasoline. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4).
162 See 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a). Unlike with emission standards, there is no conditional exemption for
California. At the time of this writing there is also litigation concerning whether another provision of
EPCA, 42 U.S.C. §6297, preempts local ordinances that ban new natural gas hookups. See Cal. Rest.
$VV¶QY%HUNHOH\:/ -XO\ 
163 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). There has been a significant amount of litigation about the scope of
preemption under this provision, in part because FIFRA also contains a savings clause at 7 U.S.C. §
136v(a). See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law Tort
Claims, 7 MINN. J. L. SCIENCE & TECH. 89 (2005).
164 See 15 U.S.C. § 2617.
165 See supra Part II.
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of the CAA which, in important respects, is less prescriptive than the CWA.166
These laws both contain broad (if not overly specific) savings clauses, and
include no language presuming to dictate the form or nature of state
regulatory measures. Just as the CWA and CAA leave room for states to
adopt more stringent controls on air and water pollution through legislation
and regulation, they also leave room for states to impose more stringent
requirements on facilities through the state common law of both public and
private nuisance.167 In the absence of a preemptive legislation, instrument
choice is also left to state policy makers.
The recent case of Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc. is
illustrative.168 In Merrick, local landowners complained that ethanol
HPLVVLRQVIURPDZKLVNH\GLVWLOOHU\FDXVHGWKHJURZWKRI³ZKLVNH\IXQJXV´
on their properties.169 AlthouJKLWZDVXQGLVSXWHGWKDWWKHSODQW¶VHPLVVLRQV
were within the limits set by relevant federal, state, and local regulations,170
the U.S. Court of Appeals readily concluded that the Clean Air Act did not
preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing nuisance claims against the plant, any
more than the satisfaction of federal emission standards would preclude the
VWDWHIURPDGRSWLQJPRUHVWULQJHQWUHJXODWLRQV³6WDWHFRXUWVDUHDUPVRIWKH
µ6WDWH¶ DQG WKH FRPPRQ ODZ VWDQGDUGV WKH\ DGRSW DUH µUHTXLUHPHQW>V@
respectiQJ FRQWURO RU DEDWHPHQW RI DLU SROOXWLRQ´ WKH FRXUW H[SODLQHG
rejecting any claim that the CAA would preempt state common law nuisance
suits while not preempting state regulations.171 This conclusion was
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166 The CWA prohibits all discharges of pollutants from point without a permit, which is often
obtained from s state agency exercising delegated authority to administer the CWA. Under the CAA, by
contrast, the baseline default is the opposite: Emissions are presumptively allowed unless subject to a
relevant state or federal regulatory standard.
167 Some courts have held that common law nuisance actions are preempted by state environmental
regulations as a matter of state law, but this presents a separate question from whether such actions are
preempted by federal law. See, e.g.)ULFNHY*XQWHUVYLOOH6RG $OD  ³WKHUHFDQEHQR
abatable nuiVDQFHIRUGRLQJLQDSURSHUPDQQHUZKDWLVDXWKRUL]HGE\ODZ´ &LW\RI%LUPLQJKDPY&LW\
of Fairfield, 375 So.2d 438, 441 (Ala.1979) (same). In some cases, preemption is justified because the
permitting process considers those factors that would cause a facility to be considered a nuisance. See,
e.g., Fey v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 16 Tenn.App. 234, 64 S.W.2d 61, 62 (1933). See also New
England Legal Found. v&RVWOH)G G&LU  ³Courts traditionally have been reluctant
to enjoin as a public nuisance activities which have been considered and specifically authorized by the
JRYHUQPHQW´ 1RUWK&DUROLQDH[UHO&RRSHUY7HQQ9DOOH\$XWK) G-10 (4th Cir.
2010) (concluding facilities permitted under state law cannot constitute nuisances within those states).
Some states also have so-FDOOHG³QRPRUHVWULQJHQW´ODZVZKLFKEDUWKHLPSRVLWLRQRISROOXWLRQFRQWUROV
more stringent than are required by federal law. Such laws may also preempt state law nuisance actions.
See Morrison & Stockton, supra note 18, at 10286.
168 Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015).
169 See 0HUULFNY'LDJHR$PHULFD¶V6XSSO\,QF)6XSSG±68 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
170 Id. at 868.
171 Merrick, 805 F.3d at 690.
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172 Id. DW ³$OORZLQJVWDWHVWRDSSO\WKHLUFRPPRQODZWRHPLVVLRQVDGYDQFHVWKH$FW¶VVWDWHG
SXUSRVHGE\HPSRZHULQJVWDWHVWRDGGUHVVDQGFXUWDLODLUSROOXWLRQDWLWVVRXUFH´ 
173 See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 2013) (CAA does not
preempt class action nuisance claims for air pollution); Her Majesty v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 342
WK&LU  ³QRWKLQJLQWKH>&OHDQ$LU@$FWEDUVDJJULHYHGLQGLviduals from bringing a nuisance claim
pursuant to the law of the source VWDWH´ See also Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W. 2d 58
(Iowa 2014) (rejecting Clean Air Act preemption claim); Morrison & Stockton, supra note 18.
174 See ,QW¶O3DSHU&R v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987).
175 Id. DW ³7KH&:$SUHFOXGHVRQO\WKRVHVXLWVWKDWPD\UHTXLUHVWDQGDUGVRIHIIOXHQWFRQWURO
that are incompatible with those established by the procedures set forth in the Act. The saving clause
specifically preserves other state actions, and therefore nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from
EULQJLQJDQXLVDQFHFODLPSXUVXDQWWRWKHODZRIWKHVRXUFH6WDWH´ 
176 Id.
177 Id. at 499.
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VXSSRUWHGE\ERWKWKH&$$¶VWH[WDQGLWVSXUSRVH172 It is also the approach
most lower federal courts have taken.173
That the federal pollution control laws do not preempt intrastate
nuisance claims does not necessarily mean that interstate pollution claims are
not preempted. After all, prior to Milwaukee II, any such claims would have
been brought under the federal common law, and now such federal common
law claims are displaced.
The Supreme Court addressed this question shortly after Milwaukee II
in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, concluding that while federal
common law claims for interstate water pollution are displaced under
Milwaukee II, this did not leave downstream states without nuisance-based
remedies.174 Even though the Court had held previously (in Milwaukee I) that
nuisance claims for interstate pollution arose under federal common law, and
(in Milwaukee II) that the CWA displaced such federal common law,
Ouellette held that state common law actions remained insofar as they were
not preempted by the Act. Turning to the question of preemption, the Court
recognized that state law claims based upon the law of the plaintiff-state were
preempted, as conflicting with the CWA, but state law claims based upon the
law of the source state were not.175
Recognizing that the CWA allowed states to impose more stringent
standards on pollution sources within their jurisdiction, and that common law
could be the source of such standards, the Court saw nothing in the act that
would preclude downstream states from seeking to take advantage of
whatever standards apply to sources of pollution in other states.176 ³%HFDXVH
WKH$FWVSHFLILFDOO\DOORZVVRXUFH6WDWHVWRLPSRVHVWULFWHUVWDQGDUGV´WKH
Ouellette &RXUW H[SODLQHG ³WKH LPSRVLWLRQ RI VRXUFH-state law does not
disrupt the regulatory partnership established E\WKHSHUPLWV\VWHP´177
The principle underlying Ouellette is that states may not seek to
extraterritorialize their environmental preferences through nuisance
OLWLJDWLRQEXWWKH\PD\VHHNSURWHFWLRQIURPDQXSVWUHDPVWDWH¶VIDLOXUHWR
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178 For a thorough exploration of cross-boundary pollution concerns, see generally Merrill, supra
note 91.
179 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), with 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1).
180 See Merrill, supra note 77 at 180-81.
181 See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA., 615 F.3d 291, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2010)
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enforce its own environmental standards to sources of interstate pollution.178
This means that a state can adopt an environmental standard internally for
the benefit of its own citizens without also committing to provide the same
degree of protection to those in downstream states. Thus, insofar as federal
environmental regulation fails to account adequately for the interests of
downstream states, Ouellette preserves a limited means of protecting their
interests, by preventing upstream states from acting opportunistically at the
expense of those downstream.
As the CAA contains a savings clause that is quite similar to that
contained in the Clean Water Act,179 there is no reason the principle
articulated in Ouellette should not apply equally in the air pollution context.
If anything, the CWA is more prescriptive than the CAA, and the &$$¶V
savings clause is, if anything, more expansive. There is also no statutory
basis to think this principle would not also apply to climate change.
Greenhouse gas emissions are subject to regulation under the CAA, but to no
greater extent than other pollutant emissions for which nuisance actions are
not preempted. There may be sound policy reasons to treat greenhouse gases
differently, as discussed in the next section, but this is a determination that
should be made by legislators, not judges. Congress has yet to enact
legislation distinguishing greenhouse gas emissions for the purposes of
federal regulation, so there is no basis for courts inventing or embracing such
a distinction on their own.
Some have suggested that all interstate pollution claims should be
preempted so as to prevent opportunistic behavior.180 After all, states have
every incentive to capture benefits for themselves and export costs onto other
MXULVGLFWLRQV DQG ZKLFKHYHU VWDWH¶V ODZFRQWUROV DQ LQWHUVWDWH GLVSXWH PD\
seek to revise its law accordingly. If a downstream state can sue an upstream
QHLJKERU XQGHU WKH GRZQVWUHDP VWDWH¶V ODZV WKH GRZQVWUHDP VWDWH KDV DQ
incentive to adopt more stringent requirements and export the costs of
pollution control onto its upstream neighbor. Conversely, if the upstream
VWDWH¶V ODZ FRQWUROV WKHUH LV DQ LQFHQWLYH WR UHOD[ LWV VWDQGDUGV VR DV WR
capture the benefit of polluting activity, while exporting the costs
downstream. This may be accomplished by adopting lax nuisance standards
or, perhaps, by adopting a permit-based pollution control law that preempts
state law nuisance claims.181 A well-designed uniform federal rule can
restrain such opportunistic behavior.
Even if one were to accept this assessment of the relevant incentives, it
does not establish that the preemption of all interstate nuisance claims would
be preferable to the Ouellette rule. Under complete preemption, downstream
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(and downwind) states would be left at the mercy of upstream (and upwind)
jurisdictions and federal regulators. In practice, this has meant that the
interests of downstream jurisdictions have been under-protected, and often
ignored. Under the Ouellette rule, by contrast, the downstream jurisdiction
has an added opportunity to protect its interests, even if only by limiting the
ability of upstream jurisdictions to expose downstream jurisdictions to levels
of pollution the upstream jurisdictions would not accept for themselves.182 In
short, the Ouellette rule increases the protection of downstream and
downwind jurisdictions without magnifying the risk of opportunistic
behavior by those same jurisdictions, as they cannot impose standards on
upstream jurisdictions that are more constraining than the upstream
jurisdictions would impose upon themselves for the benefit of their own
residents.183 Much like the intrastate nuisance actions that have not been
preempted, nuisance actions for interstate pollution would reinforce the
purpose of federal pollution control laws without exposing sources to the risk
of potentially conflicting regulatory requirements.
V.

CLIMATE CHANGE

07/08/2022 10:39:15

182 Note that there is also the potential for opportunism in the enforcement of standards, such as
would occur if an upstream state enforced its own laws less stringently against in-state polluters that
predominantly cause pollution in downstream jurisdictions. See Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental
Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 64 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 1669, 1710-12 (2014)
(surveying empirical literature on state-level enforcement of environmental laws where interstate
spillovers are implicated).
183 See Catskill Mts Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 517 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting
CWA does not preclude states from pursuing nuisance-based remedies, but that such remedies may be
³OHVVUREXVW´WKDQUHJXODWLRQVFRXOGSURYLGH 
184 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159±61 (2009) (explaining why climate change may be
XQGHUVWRRGDVD³VXSHUZLFNHG´SUREOHP 
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Global climate change presents a unique and particularly difficult
HQYLURQPHQWDO FKDOOHQJH  ,W KDV EHHQ FDOOHG D ³VXSHU ZLFNHG SUREOHP´
because it is the sort of public policy challenge that ³GHILHV UHVROXWLRQ
because of the enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and
FRQIOLFWLQJVWDNHKROGHUVLPSOLFDWHGE\DQ\HIIRUWWRGHYHORSDVROXWLRQ´WKDW
also becomes more difficult to address over time and lacks a ready
governance framework through which to pursue policy solutions. 184 Because
climate change presents distinct challenges, it may require distinct policy
responses. One relevant question this raises is whether the distinct nature of
the climate challenge justifies a departure from traditional legal doctrines,
such as preemption. Another is whether Congress has enacted legislation
that would justify courts taking a different approach.
Global climate change is anything but a local or regional problem. To
the contrary, global climate change is just that ± a global environmental
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185 See generally, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) (describing
the commons problem); see also Dana, supra note 25 (suggesting climate change should be understood
as a commons problem).
186 See Wiener, supra QRWH  DW    ³>/@RFDO DEDWHPHQW DFWLRQV SRVH ORFDO FRVWV \HW
GHOLYHUHVVHQWLDOO\QRORFDOFOLPDWHEHQHILWV´ 
187 Id. DW  ³>/@RFDO DFWLRQ LV QRW ZHOO VXLWHG WR UHJXODWLQJ PRELOH JOREDO FRQGXFW \LHOGLQg a
JOREDOH[WHUQDOLW\´ 
188 Id. DW ³>1@RVWDWHFRXOGHIIHFWLYHO\FRQWUROLWVRZQDPELHQWOHYHORIFDUERQGLR[LGHRURWKHU
GHGs, because that ambient level is determined by the worldwide concentration of GHGs in the
DWPRVSKHUH´ .LUVWHQ+(QJHO Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change
Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL¶Y REV. 119, 120 (2008) ³>R]eductions in greenhouse gas emissions at
WKH«VWDWHOHYHODUHJHQHUDOO\WRRVPDOOWRDIIHFWJOREDOFRQFHQWUDWLRQV´ .
189 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate
Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499,    ³)HZVWDWHVKDYHVHWFOHDUHPLVVLRQVUHGXFWLRQWDUJHWV
DQGIHZHUVWLOOKDYHGHVLJQHGSROLFLHVWRDFKLHYHWKHP´ 
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concern. As a consequence, the traditional arguments for allowing state and
local governments a relatively free hand to protect their own backyards may
not apply with equivalent force. Under principles of subsidiarity, the global
nature of climate change would counsel greater centralization of policy
decisions into national, if not international, hands, and less authority for state
and local governments.
State or local jurisdictions wishing to combat global climate change are
FRQIURQWHGZLWKDQDUFKHW\SDO³FRPPRQV´SUREOHP185 The global climate is
a vast global commons to which everyone contributes greenhouse gas
emissions. Emissions anywhere on the globe contribute to the increase in
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and the eventual warming
of the atmosphere. Any state that reduces emissions within its jurisdiction
will bear the costs of such reductions, but not reap equivalent benefits.
Whatever benefits accrue from greenhouse gas emission controls accrue
globally.186 $VDFRQVHTXHQFHVWDWHVKDYHHYHU\LQFHQWLYHWR³IUHHULGH´RQ
the efforts of their neighbors, rather than suffer costs that will yield few
internal benefits. Absent cooperation or the imposition of federal (or
international) requirements, state and local efforts are unlikely to provide
anything approaching the optimal level of greenhouse mitigation measures.187
The disincentive for states to take meaningful action to address climate
change are even greater than in the typical commons context, however. No
state, acting alone, is even capable of adopting emission controls capable of
making a dent in global emissions, let alone global atmospheric
concentrations, of greenhouse gases.188 Even working together, states are not
capable of reducing projected climate change and its anticipated effects to
any meaningful degree. This may help explain why outside of California,
most state-level climate change policies until relatively recently have been
largely symbolic or structured so as to advantage in-state interests. Few
imposed meaningful and enforceable emission targets in the short term,189
though this has started to change as the need for climate action has increased.
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In the case of a nationally or globally dispersed pollutant, state
regulation will often be less efficient than available alternatives. Localized
measures are also likely to be more costly, and less cost-effective, than
national measures. A local cap-and-trade system, for example, will cover a
more limited set of sources, and fewer savings opportunities, than a national
system with a broader base.190 Subjecting businesses to a variety of state
standards may also be less efficient than a standardized federal regulatory
regime.191
States are more likely to adopt meaningful emission reductions if they
can externalize the costs of such measures on other jurisdictions. Such
regional rent-seeking has been well-documented in environmental law,192 and
almost certainly occurs in the climate context as well.193 In the context of
public nuisance suits, it is reasonable to fear that state officials who file such
suits get the political benefits of appearing to take action against climate
change, without having to bear the costs of imposing economic burdens on
in-state firms.
$OORZLQJ LQGLYLGXDO VWDWHV WR DFWDV HQYLURQPHQWDO ³ODERUDWRULHV´ FDQ
produce useful information about the relative cost-effectiveness of various
mitigation measures.194 If states are free to experiment with competing policy
designs, other states and the federal government can learn from state policy
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190 Wiener, supra QRWHDW QRWLQJDQDWLRQDOHPLVVLRQVFRQWUROUHJLPH³IRUIHLWVWKHJUHDWHU
FRVWVDYLQJVREWDLQDEOHLQDODUJHUDOORZDQFHWUDGLQJPDUNHWHQFRPSDVVLQJPRUHFRXQWULHV´ 
191 DeShazo & Freeman, supra QRWHDW ³)LUPVRSHUDWLQJLQPXOWLSOHVtates may well find
that the states are adopting different approaches to achieve the same objective, making compliance
FRQIXVLQJDQGSRWHQWLDOO\FRVWO\´ 5REHUW%0F.LQVWU\-U 7KRPDV'3HWHUVRQThe Implications of
the New “Old” Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace
when States Take the Lead, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61, 89 (2007) ³A multiplicity
of contrasting state programs can pose particular difficulties for the regulated community, which operates
LQPDUNHWVWKURXJKRXWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKHZRUOG´ :LHQHUsupra note 24, at 1974.
192 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR (1981)
(chronicling regional rent-seeking another special interest influence on Clean Air Act Amendments); B.
Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 ECON.
INQUIRY 551 (1985).
193 See Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 207 (2002)
194 Some scholars have questioned the value of such experimentation. See, e.g., Michael A.
Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636 (2017); Charles W. Tyler & Heather K.
Gerken, The Myth of the Laboratories of Democracy, (January 29, 2022). GWU Law School Public Law
Research Paper No. 2021-46, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3902092 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902092. Interestingly enough, these critiques do not engage much with
the empirical literature on state experimentation. See, e.g., TESKE, supra note 151. For a review of the
literature in the context of environmental policy, see Millimet, supra note 182; see also Bruce G.
Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on
Regulatory Standards, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 52 (2016); Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental
Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1, 11-17 (John A. List & Aart de
Zeeuw eds., 2002) (summarizing empirical literature).
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successes.195 Several federal environmental statutes are modeled, at least in
part, on state programs.196 Even where such experiments fail, useful
information will result.197 Experience in other contexts has shown that
interjurisdictional competition can encourage policy innovation as
policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental and other demands
of their constituents.198 In this way, state experimentation in the climate
context could improve federal climate policies.
Some advocates of more aggressive climate policy measures note that
the adoption of state environmental measures has often prompted the
enactment of federal policies. If a state initiative is particularly successful, it
may encourage federal regulation. Even if state measures are not so
successful, they may still create incentives for federal action, even if only to
preempt state rules with a uniform federal standard.199 As has occurred in the
past, state greenhouse gas regulations could prompt industry support for
national standards that would preempt variable state controls.200 Indeed, the
prospect of nuisance suits themselves may prompt support for federal
legislative action.
The above suggests that there are serious arguments for centering
climate change policy at the federal level, but these are policy arguments, not
legal ones. While federal climate legislation that constrains state-level
regulation and common law litigation may be desirable, no such legislation
has been adopted. To the contrary, Congress has studiously avoided adopting
meaningful federal climate legislation.201 The only reason federal greenhouse
JDV UHJXODWLRQ H[LVWV LV EHFDXVH WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW FRQFOXGHG WKH &$$¶V
language was capacious enough to reach such emissions202²a conclusion the

07/08/2022 10:39:15

and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change,
12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 16 (2004) (citing examples of federal environmental laws modeled on
state predecessors).
197 See TESKE, supra QRWHDW QRWLQJWKDWHYHQZKHQVWDWHH[SHULPHQWV³IDLOWKH\SURYLGH
LPSRUWDQWLQIRUPDWLRQIRURWKHUVWDWHVDQGIRUQDWLRQDOSROLF\´ 0F.LQVWU\ 3HWHUVRQsupra note 191,
at 88 ³An innovation in a particular state that fails will have less of an impact on the national economy
than a federal experiment that fails. Innovative state programs can provide examples of what to do or what
QRWWRGR´ 
198 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
199 See Elliott et al., supra note 88.
200 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 189, at 1533±  &DOLIRUQLD¶V DGRSWLRQ RI HPLVVLRQ
standards for new motor vehicles in the 1960s prompted the U.S. auto industry to support federal emission
standards that would preempt state rules. See Elliott, et al., supra note 88.
201 See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?,
36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1   ³)URPWR>@PRUHWKDQELOOVZHUHLQWURGuced in
&RQJUHVVWRUHJXODWH>JUHHQKRXVHJDVHV@EXWQRQHZHUHHQDFWHG´ 
202 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (holding greenhouse gases constitute air
pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act).
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195 See Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership: California's
Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 63 (2013).
196 See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local
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Court has seemed to back away from in subsequent cases.203 Given the
standards of federal preemption, this is a thin reed upon which to find that
state common law climate nuisance cases cannot proceed in court.
VI. PREEMPTION OF CLIMATE NUISANCE CLAIMS
Whether or not nuisance suits represent the most appropriate or
effective approach to climate change, the lack of meaningful federal action
and prospect of substantial climate change-induced costs prompted a
resurgence of climate change litigation by local governments. Because suits
under federal common law were fRUHFORVHG E\ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V AEP
decision,204 these suits rely upon state-law causes of action, including public
and private nuisance. And unlike the claims rejected in AEP, these suits
generally seek compensatory damages for current and expected costs of
climate change and climate adaptation measures.205
Much of the litigation in these cases to date has focused on procedural
and jurisdictional wrangling, focused in particular on whether these cases
belong in state or federal court. The defendant fossil fuel companies would
like to see these cases dismissed on federal preemption or other grounds,206
and have sought to remove cases to federal court where they expect such
arguments to receive a more sympathetic hearing. One such case, BP P.L.C.
v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, reached the Supreme Court, but did not
produce an opinion that touched on any of the substantive claims.207
Unlike most of the municipal plaintiffs filing state law-based nuisance
claims, New York City filed its case in federal court. Without the need for
wrangling over removal, the district court proceeded to consider (and grant)
44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 20 Side A
07/08/2022 10:39:15

203 See, e.g., Util. Air RegulatRU\*USY(3$6&W   OLPLWLQJWKH(3$¶VDXWKRULW\
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions of the
Clean Air Act); West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126, 1126 (2016) (granting a stay RIWKH(3$¶V&OHDQ
Power Plan regulating greenhouse gas emissions from power plants).
204 American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011).
205 In the wake of the AEP decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that
federal common law claims for money damages due to the interstate nuisance of climate change were also
displaced by the Clean Air Act. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858
WK&LU  ³>7@KH6XSUHPH&RXUWhas held that federal common law addressing domestic greenhouse
gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional action. That determination displaces federal common
law public nuisance actions seeking damages, as well as those actions seeking injunctive rHOLHI´ 
206 Other grounds for dismissal pressed by defendants have included lack of personal jurisdiction
and the political question doctrine, among others. See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d
466, 470 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting defendants moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction
and political question doctrine); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 126258, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018) ("BP, ConocoPhillips, Exxon, and Royal Dutch Shell
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.").
207 See BP PLC v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 141 S.Ct. 1532, 1543 (2021) (concluding
appellate court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) to consider all grounds for removal raised by
defendant).
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BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d at 466.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 475.
City of New York II, 993 F.3d at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id.
City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895 (2020).
Id. at 907.
Id. at 907-,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW³&RPSOHWHSUHHPSWLRQ´DVDEDVLVIRUUHPRYDOWRIHGHUDO
court presents a slightly different question from whether federal law preempts an applicable state law or
cause of action. Complete preemption is jurisdictional, as it precludes any state-law claim in the regulated
area, and thus serves as a basis for removal. See Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Products Co., 2022 WL
 Q VW&LU  SURYLGLQJD³FKHDWVKHHW´RQFRPSOHWHSUHHPSWLRQ 8QGHUFXUUHQWODZ
cRXUWVVKRXOGEH³UHOXFWDQW´WRILQGFRPSOHWHSUHHPSWLRQSee Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 UY.S. 58,
65 (1987).
217 See also County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733 (9th Cir. 2022) (rejecting multiple
arguments in favor of removal, including complete preemption).

44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 20 Side B

WKHGHIHQGDQWV¶PRWLRQVWRGLVPLVVRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWJOREDOZDUPLQJWRUW
claims may only be pursued under federal law, and that any such claims
under federal law are displaced by the Clean Air Act.208 Allowing New York
&LW\ WR EULQJ VWDWH ODZ FODLPV ZRXOG EH ³LOORJLFDO´ -XGJH -RKQ .HHQDQ
FRQFOXGHGJLYHQWKHLQKHUHQWO\³LQWHUVWDWHQDWXUH´RIWKHFODLPV209 Further,
WRWKHH[WHQWWKH&LW\¶VFODLPVVRXJKWWRKold defendants liable for foreign
emissions, allowing them to proceed would potentially implicate questions
of foreign policy beyond the ken of federal courts.210
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,
FLWLQJWKH³QDWXUHRIWKe harm and the existence of a complex web of federal
DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´UHJXODWLQJJUHHQKRXVHJDVHPLVVLRQV211 Although, at
the time of the case, only a fraction of domestic greenhouse gas emissions
were subject to federal regulation, and no international agreement imposed
any binding limits on such emissions at all, the court concluded that allowing
1HZ<RUN&LW\¶VFODLPVWRSURFHHGZRXOGWKUHDWHQUHSODFLQJWKH³FDUHIXOO\
FUDIWHGIUDPHZRUNV´RIIHGHUDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFOLPDWHUHJXODWLRQZLWK³D
patcKZRUNRIFODLPVXQGHUVWDWHQXLVDQFHODZ´212 Accordingly, the Second
Circuit ordered the claims dismissed.213
City of New York v. Chevron was the first federal appellate decision to
directly consider the viability of state law-based nuisance claims. In City of
Oakland v. BP PLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considered whether similar state-law claims should be removed to federal
court on the grounds that they arise under federal law for purposes of 28
U.S.C. §1331.214 In the process of considering this question, the Ninth Circuit
FRQVLGHUHGDQGUHMHFWHGWKHGHIHQGDQWIRVVLOIXHOFRPSDQLHV¶DUJXPHQWVWKDW
2DNODQG¶V FOLPDWH WRUW FODLPV VKRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG WR UDLVH VXEVWDQWLDO
federal questions215 or were completely preempted by the Clean Air Act.216
On this basis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had been
ZURQJWRUHPRYHDQGGLVPLVVWKHFLWLHV¶FODLPV217 More recently, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and First Circuit
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218 See supra note 9 and cases cited therein.
219 $VWKH86&RXUWRI$SSHDOVIRUWKH)LUVW&LUFXLWQRWHGWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLWKDG³FRQVLGHUHGWKH
IRVVLOIXHOSURGXFHUV¶µSUHHPSWLRQGHIHQVHRQLWVRZQWHUPVQRWXQGHUWKHKHLJKWHQHGVWDQdard unique to
WKHUHPRYDELOLW\LQTXLU\¶´5KRGH,VODQGY6KHOO2LO3URGXFWV&R:/  VW&LU 
220 See id. DW  ³HYHQDVVXPLQJ ZLWKRXWJUDQWLQJ WKDWWKHVHFRQFHUQVFRQVWLWXWHµXQLTXHO\IHGHUDO
LQWHUHVWV¶ZH² like the Fourth Circuit in BP P.L.C. ² find that the Energy Companies (despite being
the burden-EHDUHURQWKHUHPRYDOLVVXH QHYHUDGHTXDWHO\GHVFULEHKRZµDQ\VLJQLILFDQWFRQIOLFWH[LVWV
EHWZHHQ¶WKHVHµIHGHUDOLQWHUHVWV¶DQGWKHVWDWH-ODZFODLPV´ FOHDQHGXS 
221 City of New York II, 993 F.3d at 93-94.
222 Id. at 85-86.
223 Id. at 86.
224 City of New York II, 993 F.3d at 89.
225 Id. at 93-94.
226 Id. at 89-90.
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reached the same conclusion.218 While these decisions focused on complete
preemption, which would have justified removal to federal court, and not on
regular preemption as a defense, the analyses adopted by these courts conflict
with that of the Second Circuit.219 Among other things, they rejected the
GHIHQGDQWV¶FODLPWKDWWKHUHZDVDQ\FRQIOLFWEHWZHHQWKHVWDWHODZFODLPV
and meaningful federal interests.220
The Second Circuit did not have to consider the question of removal,
however, and could focus directly on the question of whether federal law
allows a municipality to pursue nuisance claims against fossil fuel producers
for the marketing and sale of fossil fuels and the climate change damages that
result.221 )URPWKHRXWVHWWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VRSLQLRQGLVPLVVLQJ1<&¶V
claims makes clear that the court did not consider climate change-related
claims to be fit for federal judicial resolution.222 In reaching its ultimate
conclusion, the court stretched existing doctrine and distorted the broader
legal context by, among other things, misconstruing the relationship between
the federal and state governments in environmental law, exaggerating the
H[WHQW WR ZKLFK FOLPDWH FKDQJH LV VXEMHFW WR UHJXODWLRQ XQGHU ³FDUHIXOO\
GUDIWHGIUDPHZRUNV´DGRSWHGWKURXJKWKH³SROLWLFDOSURFHVV´223 and largely
ignoring the lessons of Milwaukee II and Ouellette.
$OWKRXJK1<&EURXJKWLWVFODLPVXQGHUVWDWHODZWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶V
analysis of the claims begins with federal common law, and a strained
reading of Milwaukee II. After noting that there is no general federal
common law post Erie WKH &RXUW SRLQWHG RXW WKDW ³specialized federal
FRPPRQ ODZ´ FRQWLQXHG WR H[LVW LQ ZKLFK LW FRQWLQXHV WR ³SUH-empt and
UHSODFH´VWDWHODZZKHUHGLVWLQFWIHGHUDOLQWHUHVWVRUOHJLVODWLYHLQVWUXFWLRQVR
require.224 <HWVXFKIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZRQO\H[LVWVLQ³IHZDQGUHVWULFWHG´
areas in which federal courts are required to answer inherently federal
questions that are not controlled by existing federal statutes.225 In this
IDVKLRQWKHFRXUWQRWHG³IHGHUDOFRPPRQODZIXQFWLRQVPXFKOLNHOHJDOGXFW
tape ± LW LV D µQHFHVVDU\ H[SHGLHQW¶ WKDW SHUPLWV Iederal courts to address
issued of national concern until Congress provides a more permanent
VROXWLRQ´226
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227 Id. at 91-82 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972)).
228 Cf. 0D\RUDQG&LW\&RXQFLORI%DOWLPRUHY%33/&)WK WK&LU  ³:H
FDQQRW FRQFOXGH WKDW DQ\ IHGHUDO FRPPRQ ODZ FRQWUROV %DOWLPRUH¶V VWDWH-law claims because federal
FRPPRQODZLQWKLVDUHDFHDVHVWRH[LVWGXHWRVWDWXWRU\GLVSODFHPHQW>@´ 
229 $PRQJ RWKHU WKLQJV LI VWDWHV RU DQ\ RWKHU OLWLJDQWV  FRXOG DOWHU D FRXUW¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI
substantive questions merely by filing amicus curiae briefs, this would create significant incentives and
opportunities for strategic behavior to manipulate case outcomes.
230 City of New York II, 993 F.3d at93.
231 Id. at 86.
232 For a critique of this holding, see Adler, supra note 27.
233 See Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 15, 30
(2014) (³&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVSHUKDSVWKHTXLQWHVVHQWLDOH[DPSOHRIDQHZHQYLURQPHQWDOSUREOHPWKDWWKH
&OHDQ$LU$FWGLGQRWFRQWHPSODWH´ 

44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 21 Side B

Claims based on climate change, the Court concluded, necessarily fall
into the category of matters subject to federal common law. This is due to
the cross-ERXQGDU\QDWXUHRIWKHDOOHJHGKDUPVDQGWKHUHVXOWLQJ³RYHUULGLQJ
QHHGIRUDXQLIRUPUXOHRIGHFLVLRQ´DVZHOODVWKH³EDVLFLQWHUHVWVRI
IHGHUDOLVP´227 In other words, while disclaiming federal common law, the
court relied upon federal common law to conclude state-law-based claims
were preempted, so as to set the stage for a displacement analysis. In the
process, it ignored the lesson of Milwaukee II that federal common law
concerning interstate pollution no longer exists because it has been
displaced,228 and omitted consideration of Ouelette¶V implicit conclusion that
a uniform federal rule is unnecessary for the resolution of pollution problems
that implicate more than one state.
7R EXWWUHVV LWV FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW 1HZ <RUN &LW\¶V FODLPV LPSOLFated
federal interests, the Court referenced irrelevant considerations²such as the
fact that multiple states filed amicus briefs in the case229²and claimed that
DOORZLQJ OLWLJDWLRQ RYHU IRVVLO IXHO SURGXFWLRQ ZRXOG ³XSVHW>@ WKH FDUHIXO
balance that has been struck between the prevention of global warming, a
project that necessarily requires national standards and global participation,
on the one hand, and energy production, economic growth, foreign policy,
DQG QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ RQ WKH RWKHU´230 This is a fine list of policy
considerations that might inform legislative policy on climate change, but
such a policy has never been enacted²at least not by Congress²so there is
QR³FDUHIXOEDODQFH´WREHSUHVHUYHG&RQWUDU\WRWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VFODLP
Congress hDVQHYHUHQDFWHGRUUDWLILHGDQ\³FDUHIXOO\FUDIWHGIUDPHZRUNV´WR
govern greenhouse gas emissions.231 Even assuming the Supreme Court was
correct in Massachusetts v. EPA to conclude that the greenhouse gases are
air pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act,232 none of the
relevant statutory provisions were written with greenhouse gases in mind, let
DORQH ZHUH FUDIWHG WR VWULNH D ³FDUHIXO EDODQFH´ EHWZHHQ HFRQRPLF DQG
environmental concerns.233 <HWXQGHUWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VORJLF&RQJUHVV¶V
inaction²specifically its failure to enact climate change legislation of any
sort²VRPHKRZUHSUHVHQWVWKHVRUWRI³FDUHIXOEDODQFH´EHWZHHQHFRQRPLF
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234 City of New York II, 993 F.3d at 90 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quotation marks
omitted).
235 Id.
236 Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 2022 WL 1617206, *4±5 (1st Cir. 2022); Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 31 F. 4th 178, 204 (4th Cir. 2022).
237 Rhode Island, 2022 WL at *4-5; Mayor of Baltimore, 31 F. 4th at 204.
238 See Percival, supra note 94, at 768 (summarizing the proceedings on remand and eventual
settlement).
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and environmental interests that federal courts are obliged to respect by
turning away state-law-based tort claims.
:KLOHQRWLQJWKDW³WKHQHFHVVDU\FRQIOLFWQHHGQRWEHDVVKDUSDVWKDW
which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when Congress legislates in a field
ZKLFKWKH>V@WDWHVKDYHWUDGLWLRQDOO\RFFXSLHG´WKHQWKH&RXUWDFNQRZOHGJHG
WKDW³FRQIOLFWWKHUHPXVWEH´234 7KH³PHUHH[LVWHQFHRIDIHGHUDOLQWHUHVW´
ZLWKRXWPRUH³GRHVQRWLQWULQVLFDOO\FDOOIRUDFRUUHVSRQGLQJIHGHUDOUXOH´235
Yet as noted by the First and Fourth Circuits, the Court identified no
meaningful conflict between federal and state law at all (let alone with the
degree of specificity necessary for complete preemption to justify
removal).236
+DYLQJFRQFOXGHGWKDW1<&¶VFODLPVFRXOGRQO\SURFHHGXQGHUIHGHUDO
common law, the Second Circuit easily reached the conclusion that any such
claims are displaced by the Clean Air Act. As the Second Circuit saw it, this
case was simply AEP URXQGWZRGHVSLWH1<&¶VDWWHPSWWRSOHDGVWDWHODZ
claims, and because (as the Second Circuit framed the case) the Clean Air
$FWKDGQRWDXWKRUL]HG1<&¶VVXLWit was preempted.
7KH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VDQDO\VLVLVGLIILFXOWWRVTXDUHZLWKOuellette. At
issue in Ouellette was an interstate conflict over water pollution, precisely
the sort of conflict the Supreme Court had held was the proper subject of
federal common law in Milwaukee I8QGHUWKHORJLFRIWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶V
opinion, the proper approach to the Ouellette claims would have been to first,
note that the claim was of the sort that should properly arise under federal
common law, and then second, hold that any such claim is displaced under
Milwaukee II. Yet that is not at all what the Supreme Court did in Oullette.
Instead, in recognizing the federal common law was displaced, the Court
DOORZHGWKHGRZQVWUHDPSODLQWLIIV¶FODLPVWRSURFHed, albeit under the law of
the source state.237 As it happened, this did not result in the application of a
less stringent standard, and the defendant polluter, International Paper,
agreed to a substantial settlement after trial.238
Under Ouellette, the displacement of federal common law does not
mean that claims of an interstate or cross-boundary character are to be
dismissed as beyond the province of the courts. Rather, displacement means
that federal common law is unavailable, either to resolve or preempt the
downstream oUGRZQZLQGSODLQWLIIV¶FODLPV$FFRUGLQJO\VWDWHODZFODLPV
may proceed, so long as they rely upon the law of the source state (to which
the defendants have presumably acceded).

44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 22 Side B
File: Document1

256

07/08/2022 10:39:15
Created on: 6/21/2022 11:34:00 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY

Last Printed: 7/8/2022 2:18:00 AM

[VOL. 17.2

07/08/2022 10:39:15

239 See Ronald. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (discussing how
rights holders may bargain to resolve pollution-related disputes); Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the
Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does that Tort Law Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASH. L.J. 583,
599 (2002) (noting how such solutions become more difficult as the number of parties increases); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Common Law the Free Market Solution to Pollution? CRITICAL REVIEW, vol.
24, no. 1 (2012).
240 City of New York II, 993 F.3d at 99.
241 Id. at 100.
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While the Second Circuit was convinced there needed to be a uniform
federal law to guide resolution of the interstate dispute, Ouellette reached the
RSSRVLWHFRQFOXVLRQ'XHWRGLVSODFHPHQWWKHUHLVQR³QHXWUDO´IHGHUDOUXOH
to be had beyond that provided by any applicable federal statute, so states
must instead press their claiPVXQGHUWKHVRXUFHVWDWH¶VODZ ODZLWVKRXOGEH
repeated, which has not been preempted by the relevant federal statutes).
/LWWOHLQWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VRSLQLRQLVUHVSRQVLYHWRWKLVSRLQWRWKHUWKDQD
brief suggestion that a bilateral water pollution dispute of the sort at issue in
Ouellete ZDV³PRUHERXQGHG´DQGWKXVOHVVWKUHDWHQLQJWRZKDWWKH6HFRQG
Circuit imagined was a detailed and carefully balanced federal regulatory
regime. The dispute in Oulette PD\ZHOOKDYHEHHQ³PRUHERXQGHG´LQWKDW
it concerned a dispute concerning pollution within a discrete water body, and
not the global atmosphere. There is also little question that the transaction
costs involved in bilateral pollution disputes are lower than when more
entities are involved.239 Yet there is nothing in the applicable Supreme Court
precedent to make this fact remotely relevant to the question of preemption.
As a doctrinal matter, this basis for distinguishing Oullette is invented from
whole cloth. Further, as noted above, however carefully balanced one
believes the Clean Air Act may be in its approach to conventional air
pollutants, there is nothing in the Act representing any sort of conscious
legislative balance of the interests implicated by greenhouse gas emissions
and climate change. Those CAA provisions applicable to greenhouse gases
were not drafted with an eye toward the control of globally dispersed
pollutants, and they have never been held to preempt state law.
The Second Circuit compounded the error by suggesting that whether
NYC could press state law claims was dependent upon what powers federal
ODZ³JUDQWHG´RU³SHUPLWV´VWDWHVWRH[HUFLVHLQHQYLURQPHQWDOODZ 240 This
characterization betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the underlying
cooperative federalism framework. Under federal environmental laws, states
DUHQRW³JUDQWHG´SRZHURUGLVFUHWLRQWRFRQWUROSROOXWLRQ6XFKSRZHULVQRW
WKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VWRJUDQW6XFKSRZHUSUHH[LVWHGWKHDGRSWLRQRI
federal pollution control statutes and, on accord of the broad savings clauses,
is generally preserved, whether such power is exercised through state
statutes, regulations, or common law. Likewise, the Clean Air Act does not
³SHUPLW´ RU ³DXWKRUL]H>@´241 states to adopt their own, more stringent air
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242 Other supporters of federal preemption of state-law-based claims have also adopted this
erroneous formulation. See Damien M. Schiff & Paul Beard II, Preemption at Midfield: Why the Current
Generation of State-Law-Based Climate Change Litigation Violates the Supremacy Clause, 49 ENVTL. L.
853, 881 (2019) ³Congress can authorize rather than preclude the states to regulate, as it has done on a
FRRSHUDWLYHEDVLVWRDGGUHVVDKRVHRIHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHV´  HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
243 See supra Part II.
244 See In re M.T.B.E. Products Liability Litigation, 725 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2013).
245 Id. at 82.
246 See Schiff & Beard, supra QRWH  DW  ³,PSRVLWLRQ RI OLDELOLW\ IRU GLUHFWO\ HPLWWLQJ RU
contributing to the emission of greenhouse gases otherwise regulated by the Act would, contrary to
&RQJUHVV¶V GHVLJQ UHTXLUH WKH VWDWH-law-based climate defendants to conform their activities (or be
SXQLVKHGIRUQRWKDYLQJFRQIRUPHGWKHLUDFWLYLWLHV WRPXOWLSOHDQGYDU\LQJJUHHQKRXVHJDVVWDQGDUGV´ 
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pollution controls, as the Second Circuit claims.242 It rather leaves such
preexisting police power authority undisturbed. Yet by inverting the
structure of federal environmental law²suggesting that state actions must be
authorized or permitted by the federal government²the Second Circuit
effectively flipSHGWKHSUHVXPSWLRQHQDEOLQJLWWRGLVSDWFK1<&¶VFODLPVDV
if they were subject to displacement, instead of conducting a more serious
and subtle preemption analysis. In the process, the Court embraced a degree
of phantom federal hegemony that devalues the federalism concerns
protected by the Supreme Court in Ouellette.
0RUHEURDGO\WKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VODQJXDJHUHSUHVHQWVDYLHZRIVWDWH
DXWKRULW\ WKDW LV ZKROO\ DW RGGV ZLWK WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V IHGHUDOLVP
jurisprudence of the past thirty years. States are not units of the federal
government, limited to adopting those environmental measures the federal
government delegates to them. States do not need²and have never
needed²federal permission to enact and enforce their own environmental
laws or to enforce state common law limitations on polluting activity. As
discussed earlier, states have been engaged in such efforts far longer than has
the federal government.243
Interestingly enough, the Second Circuit had previously rejected
preemption defenses against litigation New York City and other jurisdictions
filed against producers of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE).244 As in the
FOLPDWH OLWLJDWLRQ WKH PXQLFLSDO SODLQWLIIV PDLQWDLQHG WKDW 07%(¶V
producers had produced, distributed and sold a product with knowledge of
the environmental harms it could cause.245 And as in the climate cases, the
defendants sought to argue that such state law claims were preempted by
federal law. It is not clear why claims against producers of fossil fuels should
have been treated differently. While there may be sound policy reasons for
treating climate change differently from other sorts of pollution problems,
that is a choice left to the political branches.
Some have argued that allowing states to impose liability on emitters or
SURGXFHUV RI IRVVLO IXHOV ZRXOG IUXVWUDWH ³&RQJUHVV¶V GHVLJQ´ DV LW ZRXOG
induce defendants to alter their behavior beyond that which is required by
federal law.246 It is certainly true that the imposition of liability for emissions
might have the same effect as the imposition of more stringent state-level
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247 Cf. $PHULFDQ %XV $VV¶Q Y 6ODWHU  )G   '& &LU   6HQWHOOH - FRQFXUULQJ 
³&RQJUHVV VIDLOXUHWRJUDQWDQDJHQF\DJiven power is not an ambiguity as to whether that power has,
in fact, been granted. On the contrary, and as this Court persistently has recognized, a statutory silence on
WKHJUDQWLQJRIDSRZHULVDGHQLDORIWKDWSRZHUWRWKHDJHQF\´ .
248 See Richard Epstein, The Private Law Connections to Public Nuisance Law: Some Realism About
Today’s Intellectual Nominalism -/(&21 32/¶<66 (2022).
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emission standards on defendants, but this is insufficient to make the point.
The CAA does not preempt the imposition of more stringent state air
pollution controls.
To the contrary, consistent with most federal
environmental laws, the CAA allows states to impose more stringent
environmental controls on federally regulated facilities, as well as to regulate
HPLVVLRQV QRW VXEMHFW WR &$$ OLPLWDWLRQV  8QGHU WKH ³FRRSHUDWLYH
IHGHUDOLVP´PRGHOVWDWHDXWKority to use the police power to control pollution
LV OHIW XQGLVWXUEHG DV WKLV ZDV &RQJUHVV¶V H[SUHVV LQWHQW  $V GLVFXVVHG
earlier, if a given facility is subject to both federal and state standards, the
more stringent standard controls (save in those rare instance in which
compliance with one standard would affirmatively preclude compliance with
the other). Failure to enact climate-specific legislation is hardly evidence of
DQ\OHJLVODWLYH³GHVLJQ´)DLOXUHWRHQDFWOHJLVODWLRQLVMXVWWKDW$IDLOXUHto
enact legislation. 247
Some might argue that it should be easier to preempt state tort law than
state-level administrative regulation, but such a principle cannot be derived
from existing doctrine, the history of federal preemption, or the history of
environmental protection. Given that states are allowed to adopt more
VWULQJHQWSROOXWLRQFRQWUROVRQIHGHUDOO\UHJXODWHGIDFLOLWLHVWKHVWDWH¶VFKRLFH
of regulatory instrument should make little difference. Whether a state wants
to adopt technology mandates through administrative regulation, pollution
fees or taxes through legislation, or some form of liability to be adjudicated
in court should have no bearing on the preemption question. Nothing in the
Clean Air Act indicates Congress sought to prevent states from
complementing administrative regulation with common law or other
litigation. As a policy matter, some may believe that the preemption inquiry
should track that for displacement.248 But this is not the doctrine, nor has
Congress legislated such a choice.
As a legal matter, the lack of preemption of state-law suits concerning
conventional air pollutants should settle the question. As noted above, the
relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act were not written to address
greenhouse gases. Instead, they were written to address conventional air
pollutants. Given the centrality of legislative intent in the preemption
analysis, if none of these provisions preempts preempt state-law-based
nuisance claims concerning the sorts of pollution for which these provisions
were crafted, it is hard to see how they could preempt other types of pollution
ZKLFKZHUHVFDUFHO\RQWKHOHJLVODWXUH¶VUDGDU

44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 24 Side A
File: Document1

2022]

07/08/2022 10:39:15
Created on: 6/21/2022 11:34:00 AM

Last Printed: 7/8/2022 2:18:00 AM

DISPLACEMENT AND PREEMPTION OF CLIMATE NUISANCE CLAIMS

259

Broader doctrinal currents, including the canon disfavoring statutory
interpretations the intrude upon state prerogatives249 as well as the Supreme
&RXUW¶V DSSDUHQW HPEUDFH RI D ³PDMRU TXHVWLRQV´ GRFWULQH XQGHU ZKLFK
Congress is presumed not to have remained silent when resolving significant
policy questions reinforce this conclusion.250 Preempting longstanding state
authority to protect state citizens from air and water pollution is not
something one would expect Congress to do without being explicit about it.251
6XFKSUHHPSWLRQZRXOGEHWKHSURYHUELDO³HOHSKDQW´WKDWLVQRWWREHKLGGHQ
in a mousehole.252 Congress undoubtedly has the power to preempt state laws
concerning such questions, but it is a power that should actually be exercised
before such preemption can be found.
7KH RXWFRPH RI WKH 6HFRQG &LUFXLW¶V GHFLVLRQ PD\ EH GHVLUDEOH DV D
policy matter. A carefully constructed and balanced federal regulatory
regime may well be preferable to a bevy of state-law-based suits brought by
various jurisdictions around the country.253 Yet under existing preemption
doctrine, not to mention the structure of the Constitution, this choice is to be
made by the legislature, not the courts.254 7KH 6HFRQG &LUFXLW¶V EOLWKH
characterizations notwithstanding, that is not a choice Congress has yet made
in the context of climate change.
CONCLUSION
Under existing doctrine, federal common law claims alleging climaterelated harms are displaced, but state law claims are not preempted. Suits
alleging that various activities cause or contribute to climate nuisances
44408 GME 17:2 Sheet No. 24 Side A
07/08/2022 10:39:15

249 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-   UHTXLULQJ D ³FOHDU VWDWHPHQW´ RI
Congressional intent to preempt state authority); see also United States v Bass, 404 US 336, 349 (1971)
VWDWLQJWKDW³XQOHVV&RQJUHVVFRQYH\VLWVSXUSRVHFOHDUO\LWZLOOQRWEHGHHPHGWRKDYHVLJQLILFDQWO\
changed the federal-VWDWHEDODQFH´ 
250 See Natl Fed. Indep. Bus. v. 'HSWRI/DERU6&W   ³:HH[SHFW&RQJUHVVWR
speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political
VLJQLILFDQFH´ $OD$VVQRI5HDOWRUVY'HSWRI+HDOWKDQG+XPDQ6HUYV6&W 2021)
(same).
251 See Kalen, supra QRWHDW ³%HFDXVHKHDOWKDQGWKHHQYLURQPHQWDUHDUHDVZKHUHVWDWHV
traditionally exercised either common law or statutory jurisdiction to protect their citizens, judges are
KHVLWDQWWRXSVHWWKDWEDODQFH´ 
252 See :KLWPDQY$PHULFDQ7UXFNLQJ$VV¶QV86   ³&RQJUHVVZHKDYHKHOG
does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions²it
GRHVQRWRQHPLJKWVD\KLGHHOHSKDQWVLQPRXVHKROHV´ See also MCI Telecom. Corp. v. AT&T., 512
U.S. 218, 231 (1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159±60 (2000); Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1626±27 (2018).
253 See supra note 25 and sources cited therein.
254 See 9LUJLQLD8UDQLXP,QFY:DUUHQ6&W   ³,QYRNLQJVRPHEURRGLQJ
federal interest or appealing to a judicial policy preference should never be enough to win preemption of
DVWDWHODZDOLWLJDQWPXVWSRLQWVSHFLILFDOO\WRDµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWH[WRUDIHGHUDOVWDWXWH¶WKDWGRHVWKH
GLVSODFLQJRUFRQIOLFWVZLWKVWDWHODZ´ 
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255 See Cheren, supra note 94.
256 And sometimes such preemption creates takings concerns. See, e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of Sup'rs
In and For Kossuth County, 584 N.W. 2d 309 (Iowa 1998) (state law providing immunity from nuisance
suits constituted an uncompensated taking of property).
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should rise and fall on other questions and, as noted at the outset, there are
many concerns that can be raised about such claims under state law. It is also
possible that the prospect of ongoing climate litigation, if not the threat of
climate change itself, will eventually prompt the enactment of federal climate
legislation that preempts such suits in the course of enacting a federal climate
policy. But in the meantime, courts should adhere to the choices Congress
has made, and not find creative ways to displace or preempt state-law-based
nuisance claims that Congress has not yet seen fit to prevent.
0XFKRIWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VDQDO\VLVVHHPVWREHGULYHQE\WKHZHOOfounded intuition that interstate pollution conflicts, like interstate water
disputes, should be governed by a federal standard, such as could be provided
by federal common law. After all, only a federal rule is capable of providing
a uniform and neutral rule for the resolution of such interstate disputes. This
was the approach once embraced by the Supreme Court. Since Milwaukee
II, however, the option of using federal common law for the provision of such
a rule has been taken off of the table.
With that most appropriate judicial means of addressing interstate
common law claims is unavailable, litigants are forced to rely upon state law,
with all of the attendant limitations and potential biases. This may be a
problem, but the answer is not for courts to declare unilaterally that such
remedies are preempted. The law of preemption is not the source of the
anomaly, however, nor has Congress sought to address it. Congress could
eventually choose to enact comprehensive measures for the control of
greenhouse gas emissions, and preempt all state law claims. It could also, if
it so chose, reopen federal courts to claims based on federal common law.
To date, Congress has done neither, and courts should respect that choice.
This is not to say there are not steps courts could take to facilitate more
effective means of accounting for transboundary environmental harms. The
&RXUW¶VUXVKWRGLVSODFHIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZQXLVDQFHFODLPs in Milwaukee
II was not dictated by legislative enactment nor grounded in any principled
concern for the inherent unworkability of federal common law. The Court
had adjudicated dozens of interstate environmental claims going back over a
century and did so without much difficulty.255 There is also no problem with
allowing continued nuisance litigation against the backdrop of environmental
regulation. This has been the norm under state law the whole time.
Sometimes state environmental laws preempt common law claims for
nuisance or trespass, and sometimes they do not. 256 In such cases it is a
question of what sorts of environmental measures the state legislature
enacted and whether such measures leave room for the common law. There
is no reason the same approach could not be adopted at the federal level.
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257 $V5LFKDUG(SVWHLQQRWHV³LWLVKDUGWRVHHZK\DQ\FRPSUHKHQVLYHVWDWXWHWKDWLVSDVVHGWRFRQWURO
pollution should leave states more vuOQHUDEOHWKDQWKH\ZHUHEHIRUHWKHSDVVDJHRIWKHVWDWXWH´(SVWHLQ
supra QRWHDW<HWWKDWLVWKHSUHFLVHHIIHFWRIWKH&RXUW¶VGLVSODFHPHQWMXULVSUXGHQFH
258 ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWUHOLDQFHXSRQIHGHUDOFRPPRQODZQHHGQRWHQWDLOMXGJHV³PDNLQJ´DV
RSSRVHGWR³ILQGLQJ´ODZSee Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA.
L. REV. 1 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (2019).
259 It is of course perfectly appropriate for courts to dismiss claims that are not properly grounded in
relevant state law, or that face other jurisdictional defects. So, for example, it may have been perfectly
appropriate for a federal district court in California to dismiss climate-based claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction. See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 2018 WL 3609055 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
260 There are various doctrines, other than preemption, that seek to prevent states from extra
territorializing their policy preferences. See generally, Cassandra Burke Robertson, The United States
Experience, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Austen
3DUULVKDQG&HGULF5\QJDHUWHGV  RQILOHZLWKDXWKRU  ³>,@WLVQRVXUSULVHWKDWWKHVFRSHRIVWDWH
power remains unclear. At one end of the spectrum, one can reliably predict that state regulation clearly
at odds with federal policy will be struck down. It is much less clear, however, whether states are
empowered to engage in extraterritorial regulation when such action seeks merely to supplement or
FRPSOHPHQWIHGHUDOSROLF\´ 
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7KHRQO\EDUULHUWRVXFKDQDSSURDFKZDVWKH&RXUW¶VGLVWDVWHIRUIHGHUDO
common law. As the Court has at times acknowledged, in the absence of
applicable legislation, interstate disputes properly arise under federal
common law, and not the law of either state. This is what the Court
recognized in the first interstate pollution cases. Since Erie, however, the
Court has resisted relying on federal common law, even where that means
disarming states from the ability to protect themselves from upstream or
upwind harms.257 This may be driven by an understandable impulse. Yet as
some commentators have noted, some resort to federal common law is
inevitable.258 (Indeed, the Second Circuit relied upon the very federal
FRPPRQODZLWFODLPVLVGLVSODFHGWRFRQFOXGH1HZ<RUN¶VVWate law claims
were preempted.) Unless and until Congress has actively and explicitly
displaced federal common law, it is questionable whether the Court should
do so on its own accord. Relaxing its antipathy for federal common law
would further allow the Court to adopt parallel standards for preemption and
displacement of interstate nuisance actions, and apply a consistent principle
to interjurisdictional harms. Climate change would be as good a context as
any in which to take this step.
Unless and until the Supreme Court or Congress approves such an
approach, and precludes further state-law-based litigation, there is no warrant
for lower courts to dismiss cases on the grounds that they must be displaced
or preempted by federal environmental statutes that have never been
understood to displace or preempt properly pled state common law claims.259
Whatever the policy merits of clearing the field for federal regulation, neither
current doctrine nor existing federal statutes support such an approach.
While there may be other bases upon which to challenge the viability of state
common law claims, statutory preemption or displacement are not among
them.260 Under current doctrine, there is nothing in the law of preemption or
displacement to stop such claims from proceeding.
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Should policymakers conclude state-law-based tort suits are a poor way
to make climate policy, they remain free to enact some alternative. Indeed,
the proliferation of state-common-law suits may well encourage such a
step.261 But unless and until they do, claims like those brought by New York
City and other municipalities should not be dismissed on preemption
grounds.
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261 See Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1605,    ³5HDOLVWLFDOO\WKHJUHDWHVWIXQFWLRQRIOLWLJDWLRQPD\EHWRSURGOHJLVODWLYHDFWLRQ´ 

